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1 Introduction 
Most economic models are based on the self -interest hypothesis that assumes that all people are 
exclusively motivated by their material self-interest. Many influential economists, including 
Adam Smith (1759), Gary Becker (1974), Kenneth Arrow (1981), Paul Samuelson (1993) and 
Amartya Sen (1995), pointed out that people often do care for the well-being of others and that 
this may have important economic consequences. Yet, so far, these opinions have not had much 
of an impact on mainstream economics. In recent years experimental economists have gathered 
overwhelming evidence that systematically refutes the self-interest hypothesis. The evidence 
suggests that many people are strongly motivated by other-regarding preferences and that 
concerns for fairness and reciprocity cannot be ignored in social interactions. Moreover, several 
theoretical papers have been written showing that the observed phenomena can be explained in a 
rigorous and tractable manner. Some of these models shed new light on problems that have 
puzzled economists for a long time like , e.g., the persistence of non-competitive wage premia, 
the incompleteness of contracts, the allocation of property rights, the conditions for successful 
collective action and the optimal design of institutions. These theories in turn induced a new 
wave of experimental research offering additional exciting insights into the nature of preferences 
and into the relative performance of competing theories of fairness. The purpose of this paper is 
to review these recent developments, to point out open questions, and to suggest avenues for 
future research. Furthermore, we will argue that it is not only necessary but also very promising 
for mainstream economics to take the presence of other-regarding preferences into account.  
Why are economists so reluctant to give up the self-interest hypothesis? One reason is that 
this hypothesis has been quite successful in providing accurate predictions in some economic 
domains. For example, models based on the self-interest hypothesis make very good predictions 
for competitive markets with standardized goods. This has been shown in many carefully 
conducted market experiments. However, a large amount of economic activity is taking place 
outside of competitive markets – in markets with a small number of traders, in markets with 
informational frictions, in firms and organizations, and under incompletely specified and 
incompletely enforceable contracts. In these environments models based on the self-interest 
assumption frequently make very misleading predictions. An important insight provided by some 
of the newly developed fairness models is that they show why in competitive environments with 
standardized goods the self-interest model is so successful and why in other environments it is 
refuted. In this way the new models provide fresh and experimentally confirmed insights into 
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important phenomena like, e. g., non-clearing markets or the wide-spread use of incomplete 
contracts.  
We consider it as important to stress that the available experimental evidence also 
suggests that many subjects behave quite selfishly even when they are given a chance to affect 
other peoples well being at a relatively small cost. However, there are also many people who are 
strongly motivated by fairness and reciprocity and who are willing to reward or punish other 
people at a considerable cost to themselves. One of the exciting insights of some of the newly 
developed theoretical models is that the interaction between fair and selfish individuals is key to 
the understanding of the observed behavior in strategic settings. These models explain why in 
some strategic settings almost all people behave as if they are completely selfish, while in others 
the same people will behave as if they are driven by fairness.  
A second reason for the reluctance to give up the self-interest hypothesis is 
methodological. There is a strong convention in economics of not explaining puzzling 
observations by changing assumptions on preferences. Changing preferences is said to open 
Pandora’s box because everything can be explained by assuming the “right” preferences. We 
believe that this convention made sense in the past when economists did not have sophisticated 
tools to examine the nature of preferences in a scientifically rigorous way. However, due to the 
development of experimental techniques this is no longer true. In fact, one purpose of this paper 
is to show that much progress and fascinating new insights into the nature of fairness preferences 
have been made in the past decade. While there is still much to be done this research clearly 
shows that it is possible to discriminate between theories based on different preference 
assumptions. Therefore, in view of the facts, the new theoretical developments, the importance of 
fairness concerns in many economic domains, and in view of the existence of rigorous 
experimental techniques that allow us to examine hitherto unsolvable problems in a scientific 
manner, we believe that it is time to recognize that a substantial fraction of the people is also 
motivated by fairness concerns. People do not only differ in their tastes for chocolate and bananas 
but also along a more fundamental dimension. They differ with regard to how selfish or fair-
minded they are, and this does have important economic consequences. 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section 2 provides many real life examples 
indicating the relevance of fairness considerations and reviews the experimental evidence. It 
shows that the self-interest model is refuted in many important situations and that a substantial 
number of people seem to be strongly concerned about fairness and behave reciprocally. Section 
3 surveys different theoretical approaches that try to explain the observed phenomena. In the 
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meantime there is also a large and growing literature on the evolutionary origins of reciprocity 
(see, e.g., Bowles and Gintis 1999, Gintis 2000, Sethi and Somananthan forthcoming and 2000). 
We do not discuss and review this literature in our paper. Section 4 discusses the wave of new 
experiments that have been conducted in order to discriminate between these theories. Section 5 
explores the implications of fairness driven behavior in various economic applications and offers 
some directions for future research. Section 6 concludes.1 In view of the length of our paper it is 
also possible to read the paper selectively. For example, readers who are already familiar with the 
basic evidence and the different fairness theories may go directly to the new evidence in Section 
4 and the economic applications in Section 5.  
 
2 Empirical Foundations of Fairness and Reciprocity 
 
2.1 Where does Fairness matter? 
 
The notion of fairness is frequently invoked in families, at the workplace, and in people’s 
interactions with neighbors, friends and even strangers. For instance, our spouse becomes sour if 
we do not bear a fair share of family responsibilities. Our children are extremely unhappy and 
envious if they receive less attention and gifts than their brothers and sisters. We do not like those 
among our colleagues who persistently escape doing their share of important yet inconvenient 
departmental activities.  
Fairness considerations are, however, not restricted to our personal interactions with 
others. They shape the behavior of people in important economic domains. For example, 
employee theft and the general work morale of employees is affected by the perceived fairness of 
the firm’s policy (Bewley 1999;.Greenberg 1990). The impact of fairness and equity norms may 
render direct wage cuts unprofitable (Agell and Lundborg 1995; Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler 
1986). Firms may, therefore, be forced to cut wages in indirect ways, e.g., by outsourcing 
activities. Fairness concerns may thus influence decisions about the degree of vertical integration. 
They may also severely affect the hold-up problem as demonstrated by Ellingsen and 
Johannesson (2000). Debates about the appropriate income tax schedule are strongly affected by 
notions of merit and fairness (Seidl and Traub 1999). The amount of tax evasion is likely to be 
affected by the perceived fairness of the tax system (Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein 1998; Alm, 
                                                
1 In the meantime there is also a large and growing literature on the evolutionary origins of reciprocity (see, e.g., 
Bowles and Gintis 1999, Ginitis 2000, Sethi and Somananthan forthcoming and 2000). We do not discuss and review 
this literature in our paper.  
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Sanchez, de Juan 1995; Frey and Weck-Hanneman 1984). Public support for the regulation of 
private industries depends on the perceived fairness of the firms’ policies (Zajac 1995). 
Compliance with contractual obligations, with organizational rules and with the law in general is 
strongly shaped by the perceived fairness of the allocation of material benefits and by issues of 
procedural justice (Fehr, Gächter and Kirchsteiger 1997, Lind and Tyler 1988). The functioning 
of incentive-compatible mechanisms has been shown to depend on fairness considerations 
(Andreoni and Varian 1999). The solution of collective action problems like, e.g., rules 
regulating the access to common pool resources, critically depends on the fairness of the 
allocation of the costs and benefits of the rules (Ostrom 1990 and 2000; Falk, Fehr and 
Fischbacher 2000c). The erosion of public support for the welfare state in the US in the last two 
decades has probably also much to do with deeply entrenched notions of reciprocal fairness 
(Bowles and Gintis 2000). Many people cease to support public programs that help the poor if 
they have the impression that the poor do not attempt to bear their share of a society’s 
obligations.  
Thus, real world examples where fairness concerns are likely to matter abound. 
Nevertheless, in the following we concentrate on clean experimental studies because in most real 
life situations it is impossible to unambiguously isolate the impact of fairness motives. A skeptic 
may always argue that the notion of fairness is only used for rhetorical purposes that disguises 
purely self-interested behavior in an equilibrium of a repeated game. Therefore, we rely on 
experimental evidence of human decision making. In these experiments real subjects make 
decisions with real monetary consequences in carefully controlled laboratory settings. In 
particular, the experimenter can implement one-shot interactions between the subjects so that 
long-term self-interest can be ruled out as an explanation for what we observe. As we will see, in 
some experiments the monetary stakes involved are quite high – amounting up to the income of 
three months’ work. In the experiments reviewed below subjects do not know each others’ 
identity, they interact anonymously and, sometimes, even the experimenter cannot observe their 
individual choices.  
 
2.2 Experimental Evidence 
In hindsight, it is a bit ironical that experiments have proven to be critical for the discovery and 
the understanding of fairness-driven behavior because for several decades experimental 
economists were firmly convinced that fairness motives would not matter much. At best, fair 
behavior was viewed as a temporary deviation from the strong forces of self-interest. In the 1950s 
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Vernon Smith discovered that under relatively weak conditions experimental markets quickly 
converge to the competitive equilibrium.2 Since then the remarkable convergence properties of 
experimental markets have been confirmed by hundreds of experiments (see, e. g., Davis and 
Holt 1993). For these experiments the equilibrium is computed under the assumption that all 
players are exclusively self-interested. Therefore, the quick convergence to equilibrium has been 
interpreted as a confirmation of the self-interest hypothesis. We will see later in this paper that 
this conclusion was premature because, as the newly developed models of fairness (see Section 3 
and Section 5.1) show, convergence to standard competitive predictions can occur even if agents 
are very strongly concerned about fairness.  
This strong commitment to the self-interest hypothesis slowly weakened in the 1980s 
when experimental economists started to study bilateral bargaining games and interactions in 
small groups in controlled laboratory settings (see e.g. Roth, Malouf and Murningham 1981, 
Güth, Schmittberger and Schwarze 1982). One of the important experimental games that 
ultimately led many people to realize that the self-interest hypothesis is problematic was the so-
called Ultimatum Game invented by Güth, Schmittberger and Schwarze (1982). In addition, the 
Gift Exchange Game, the Trust Game, the Dictator Game and Public Good Games played an 
important role in weakening the exclusive reliance on the self-interest hypothesis. All these 
games share the feature of simplicity. Because they are so simple, they are easy to understand for 
the experimental subjects and this makes inferences about subjects’ motives more convincing.  
In the Ultimatum Game (UG) a pair of subjects has to agree on the division of a fixed sum 
of money. Person A, the Proposer, can make one proposal of how to divide the amount. Person B, 
the Responder, can accept or reject the proposed division. In the case of rejection, both receive 
nothing; in the case of acceptance, the proposal is implemented. Under the standard assumptions that 
(i) both the Proposer and the Responder are rational and care only about how much money they get 
and (ii) that the Proposer knows that the Responder is rational and selfish, the subgame perfect 
equilibrium prescribes a rather extreme outcome: The Responder accepts any positive amount of 
money and, hence, the Proposer gives the Responder the smallest money unit, e, and keeps the rest.  
A robust result in the UG, across hundreds of experiments, is that proposals offering the 
Responder less than 20 percent of the available surplus are rejected with probability 0.4 to 0.6. In 
addition, the probability of rejection is decreasing in the size of the offer (see, e.g., Güth, 
Schmittberger and Schwarze, 1982; Camerer and Thaler, 1995; Roth, 1995, and the references 
                                                
2 Smith’s results were eventually published in the Journal of Political Economy in 1962, after time consuming 
debates with the referees. It is also ironical that Smith‘s init ial aim was „to do a more credible job of rejecting 
competitive price theory“ than Chamberlin (1948).  
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therein). Apparently, many Responders do not behave in a self-interest maximizing manner. In 
general, the motive indicated for the rejection of positive, yet "low", offers is that subjects view them 
as unfair. A further robust result is that many Proposers seem to anticipate that low offers will be 
rejected with a high probability. This is suggested, for example, by the comparison of the results of 
Dictator Games (DG) and Ultimatum Games. In a DG the Responder’s option to reject is removed  
the Responder must accept any proposal. Forsythe et al. (1994) were the first who compared the 
offers in UGs and DGs. They report that offers are substantially higher in the UG which suggests 
that many Proposers do apply backwards induction. This interpretation is also supported by the 
surprising observation of Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara and Zamir, 1991, who showed that the 
modal offer in the UG tends to maximize the expected income of the Proposer.3  
The UG shows that a sizeable fraction of Responders is willing to punish behavior that is 
perceived as unfair. In contrast, the Gift Exchange Game (GEG) indicates that a substantial fraction 
of the Responders are willing to reward actions that are perceived as generous or fair. The first GEG 
has been conducted by Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993). In the GEG the Proposer offers an 
amount of money w Î [ w,w
_
_ ], w_ ³ 0, which can be interpreted as a wage payment, to the 
Responder. The Responder can accept or reject w. In case of a rejection both players receive zero 
payoff; in case of acceptance the Responder has to make a costly “effort” choice e Î [ e,e
_
_ ],e_  > 0. 
The monetary payoff for the Proposer is xP = ve – w while the Responder’s payoff is xR = w – c(e) 
where v denotes the marginal value of effort for the Proposer and c(e)  the strictly increasing effort 
cost schedule.4 Under the standard assumptions (i) and (ii) above the Responder will always choose 
the lowest feasible effort level e_  and will, in equilibrium, never reject any w. Therefore, the 
subgame perfect proposal is the lowest feasible wage level w_ .  
The GEG captures a principal-agent relation with highly incomplete contracts in a stylized 
way. Variants of the GEG have been conducted by several authors.5 All of these studies report that 
the mean effort is, in general, positively related to the offered wage which is consistent with the 
interpretation that the Responders, on average, reward generous wage offers with generous effort 
                                                
3 Suleiman (1996) reports the results of UGs with varying degrees of veto power. In these games a rejection meant that l 
percent of the cake was destroyed. For example, if l = 0.8, and the Proposer offered a 9:1 division of $10, a rejection 
implied that the Proposer received $1.8 while the Responder received $0.2. Suleiman reports that Proposers’ offers are 
strongly increasing in l.  
4 In some applications of this game the Proposer’s payoff was given by xP = (v – w)e. This formulation rules out that 
Proposers can make losses when they offer generously high wages. Likewise, in some applications of the GEG the 
Responder did not have the option to reject w. Thus, the Proposer just sent w while the Responder choose an effort level. 
Under the standard assumptions of rationality and selfishness the subgame perfect equilibrium is, however, not affected 
by these differences.  
5 See, e. g., Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1993, 1998), Charness (1996, 2000), Fehr and Falk, (1999), Gächter and Falk 
(1999), Falk, Gächter and Kovacs (1999), Hannan, Kagel and Moser (1999) and Brandts and Charness (1999). 
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choices. However, as in the case of the UG, there are considerable individual differences among the 
Responders. While there typically is a sizeable fraction of Responders (frequently roughly 40 
percent, sometimes more than 50 percent) who exhibit a reciprocal effort pattern, there is also a 
substantial fraction of Responders who always make purely selfish effort choices or whose choices 
seem to deviate randomly from the self-interested action. Despite the presence of selfish Responders 
the relation between average effort and wages is in general sufficiently steep to render a high wage 
policy profitable. This induces Proposers to pay wages far above w_ . Evidence for this interpretation 
comes from Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl who embedded the GEG into an experimental market. In 
addition to the embedded GEG – there was a control condition in which the effort level was 
exogenously fixed by the experimenter. Note that in the control condition the Responders can no 
longer reward generous wages with high effort levels. It turns out that the average wage is 
substantially reduced when the effort is exogenously fixed.  
Another important game that did much to change the exclusive reliance on the self-interest 
hypothesis was the Trust Game (TG), first studied by Berg, Dickhaut and McCabe (1995). In a TG a 
Proposer receives an amount of money y from the experimenter, and then can send between zero 
and y to the Responder. The experimenter then triples the amount sent, which we term z, so that the 
Responder has 3z. The Responder is then free to return anything between zero and 3z to the 
Proposer. It turns out that many Proposers send money and that many Responders give back some 
money. Moreover, there is frequently a strong correlation between z and the amount sent back at the 
individual as well as at the aggregate level (see e.g., Miller 1997, Fahr and Irlenbusch 2000, Cox 
2000).  
Finally, we briefly consider the evidence on Public Good Games (PGGs). Like the GEG the 
PGG is not only important because it provides interesting insights into the nature of non-pecuniary 
motivations but it also captures the essence of numerous real world situations. There is by now a 
huge experimental literature on PGGs (see Ledyard, 1995, Dawes and Thaler 1988 for surveys). In 
the typical experiment there are n players who simultaneously decide how much of their endowment 
to contribute to a public good. Player i’s monetary payoff is given by xi = yi – gi + mSgj where yi is 
player i’s endowment, gi her contribution, m the monetary payoff per unit of the public good and Sgj 
the amount of the public good provided by all players. The unit payoff m obeys m < 1 < nm. This 
ensures that it is a dominant strategy to contribute nothing to the public good although the total 
surplus would be maximized if all players contributed their whole endowment.6 In many 
experiments the PGG is repeated for about 10 periods where in each period the group composition 
                                                
6 Typically, endowments are identical and n £ 10 but there are also experiments with a group size of 40 and 100 (Isaac, 
Walker and Williams 1994). 
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changes randomly. If we restrict attention to behavior in the final period (in order to abstract from 
repeated games or learning effects) it turns out that roughly 75 percent of all subjects contribute 
nothing to the public good and the rest contributes very little.7   
If one adds to the PGG the opportunity to punish other group members the contribution 
pattern changes radically (Fehr and Gächter, 2000). In a PGG with a punishment option there are 
two stages. Stage one is identical to the above described PGG. At stage two, after every player in the 
group has been informed about the contributions of each group member, each player can assign up 
to ten punishment points to each of the other players. The assignment of one punishment point 
reduces the first-stage income of the punished subject by 3 points on average but it also reduces the 
income of the punisher according to a strictly increasing and convex cost schedule. Note that since 
punishment is costly for the punisher, the self-interest hypothesis predicts zero punishment. 
Moreover, since rational players will anticipate this, the self-interest hypothesis predicts that nobody 
will contribute, i.e., there should be no difference in the contribution behavior between the usual 
PGG and a PGG with a punishment opportunity. The experimental evidence is, however, completely 
at odds with this prediction. While in the usual PGG cooperation is close to zero in the final period, 
the punishment opportunity causes, on average, stable cooperation rates around 75 percent of 
subjects’ endowment.8 The reason for these huge differences in contribution behavior is that in the 
punishment condition many cooperators punish the free-riders. The more a subject deviates from the 
average contribution of the other group members the more it is punished. Thus, the willingness to 
punish “unfair” behavior is not restricted to the UG. 
The above mentioned facts in the UG, the GEG, the TG and the PGG are now well 
established and there is little disagreement about them. But there are, of course, questions about 
which factors change the behavior in these games. For example, a question that routinely comes up 
in discussions with economists is whether a rise in the stake level will eventually induce subjects to 
behave in a self-interested manner. There are several papers examining this question (Hoffman 
McCabe and Smith 1995, Fehr and Tougareva 1995, Slonim and Roth 1998, Cameron 1999). The 
surprising answer is that relatively large increases in the monetary stakes did nothing or little to 
change behavior. Hoffman, McCabe and Smith could not detect any effect of the stake level in their 
                                                
7 At the beginning of a repeated PGG subjects contribute on average between 40 and 60 percent of their endowment 
but towards the end contributions are typically very low. This pattern may be due to repeated game effects. Another 
plausible reason for the decay of cooperation is that many subjects are conditional cooperators as shown by Croson 
(1999), Fischbacher, Gächter and Fehr (1999) and Sonnemans, Schram and Offerman (1999). Conditional cooperators 
cease to cooperate once they notice that selfish subjects take advantage of their cooperation.  
8 If the same subjects are allowed to stay together for ten periods the cooperation rate even climbs to 90 percent of 
subjects’ endowments in the final period. In Fehr and Gächter (2000) the group size was n = 4. Recently, Carpenter 
(2000) showed that with a group size of n = 10 subjects achieve almost full co-operation even with a random group 
composition over time. 
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UGs. Fehr and Tougareva conducted GEGs (embedded in a competitive exerimental market) in 
Moscow. In one condition the subjects earned, on average, the equivalent amount of the income of 
one week in the experiment. In another condition they earned the equivalent of a ten weeks’ income. 
Despite this large difference in the stake size there are no significant differences across conditions in 
the behavior of both the Proposers and the Responders. Slonim and Roth conducted UGs in 
Slovakia. They found a small interaction effect between experience and the stake level. In the final 
period of a series of one-shot UGs the Responders in the high-stake condition (with a 10-fold 
increase in the stake level relative to the low stake condition) seem to be willing to reject a bit less 
frequently. Fehr and Tougareva also allowed subjects to repeat the game (with randomly matched 
partners). They found no such interaction effects. Cameron conducted UGs in Indonesia and – in the 
high stake condition - subjects could earn the equivalent of  three months’ income in her experiment. 
She observed no effect of the stake level on Proposers’ behavior and a slight reduction of the 
rejection probability when stakes were high.  
Of course, it is still possible that in the presence of extremely high stakes there may be a shift 
towards more selfish behavior. However, for large segments of the population this is not the 
economically relevant question. For almost all people the vast majority of their decisions involves 
stake levels well below three months’ income. Thus, even if fairness-driven behavior would play no 
role at all at stake levels above that size, fairness concerns would still play a major role in many 
economically important domains.  
 
2.3 Interpretation of the Evidence 
While there is now little disagreement regarding the facts, there is still disagreement about 
the interpretation of these facts. In Section 3 we will describe several recently developed theories of 
fairness that maintain the rationality assumption but change the assumption of purely selfish 
preferences. Some researchers have, however, reservations about changes in the motivational 
assumptions and prefer, instead, to interpret the behavior in these games as elementary forms of 
bounded rationality. For example, Roth and Erev (1995) and Binmore, Gale and Samuelson (1995) 
try to explain the presence of fair offers and rejections of low offers in the UG by learning models 
that are based on purely pecuniary preferences. These models are based on the idea that the rejection 
of low offers is not very costly for the Responder and, therefore, the Responders learn only very 
slowly not to reject such offers. The rejection of offers is, however, quite costly for the Proposers. 
Therefore, Proposers learn more quickly that it does not pay to make low offers. Moreover, since 
Proposers quickly learn to make fair offers, the pressure on the Responders to learn accepting low 
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offers is greatly reduced. This gives rise to very slow convergence to the subgame perfect 
equilibrium – if there is convergence at all. The simulations of Roth and Erev and Binmore, Gale 
and Samuelson show that it often takes thousands of iterations until play comes close to the standard 
prediction.  
In our view there can be little doubt that learning processes are important in real life as well 
as in laboratory experiments. There are numerous examples where the behavior of subjects changes 
over time and it seems clear that learning models are prime candidates to explain such dynamic 
patterns. We believe, however, that attempts to explain the basic facts in such simple games as the 
UG, the GEG and the TG in terms of learning models that assume completely selfish preferences are 
misplaced. The decisions of the Responders, in particular, are so simple in these games that it is 
difficult to believe that they make systematic mistakes and reject money or reward generous offers 
although their true preferences would require them not to do so. Moreover, the above cited evidence 
from Roth et al. (1991) Forsythe et al (1995), Suleiman (1996) and Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl 
(1998) suggests that many Proposers do anticipate Responders’ actions surprisingly well. Thus, at 
least in these simple two-stage games, many Proposers seem to be quite rational and forward 
looking.  
Sometimes it is also argued that the behavior in these games is due to a social norm (see, e. 
g., Binmore 1998). In real life, so the argument goes, experimental subjects make the bulk of their 
decisions in repeated interactions. It is well known that in repeated interactions the rejection of 
unfair offers or the rewarding of generous offers can be sustained as an equilibrium. According to 
this argument, notions of fairness perform the function of selecting a particular equilibrium among 
the infinitely many equilibria that typically exist in long-term interactions. Subjects’ behavior is, 
therefore, adapted to repeated interactions and they tend to apply behavioral rules, that are 
appropriate in the context of repeated interactions, erroneously to laboratory one-shot games. This 
argument essentially boils down to the claim that subjects cannot rationally distinguish between one-
shot and repeated interactions. One problem with this argument – apart from claiming that subjects 
make systematic mistakes – is that it cannot explain the huge behavioral variations across one-shot 
games. Why do in Forsythe et al. (1995) the Proposers give so much less in the DG compared to the 
UG? Why do the Proposers in the control condition with exogenously fixed effort (Fehr, 
Kirchsteiger and Riedl 1998) make so low wage offers? Why is there so much defection in the final 
round of PGGs while in the presence of a punishment opportunity a high level of co-operation can 
be achieved? Invoking some kind of social norm cannot explain this behavior unless one is willing 
to assume that different social norms apply to these different situations. A second problem with the 
above argument is that there is compelling evidence that in repeated interactions experimental 
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subjects do behave very differently compared to one-shot situations. In Gächter and Falk (1999) it is 
shown that the Responders in GEGs put forward much higher effort levels if they can stay together 
with the same Proposer.9 In fact, experimental subjects who participate in one-shot GEGs frequently 
complain after the experiment that the experimenter ruled out repeated interactions because that 
would have enabled them, so the subjects’ claim, to develop a much more trustful and efficient 
relation with their partner. All this indicates that experimental subjects are well aware of the 
difference between one-shot interactions and repeated interactions.  
The above arguments suggest that an approach that combines bounded rationality with 
purely selfish preferences does not provide a satisfactory explanation of the facts observed in UGs, 
GEGs, TGs and PGGs. In our view, there remain two plausible approaches to account for the facts. 
One approach is to maintain the assumption of rationality at least for the analysis of these simple 
games and to assume, in addition, that some players are not only motivated by pecuniary forces. The 
other approach is, to combine models of learning with models that take into account non-selfish 
motives. In the following we focus on the first approach because there has been much progress in 
this area in recent years,  while the second approach is still in its infancy.10 
 
3 Theories of Fairness and Reciprocity 
This section surveys the most prominent recent attempts to explain the experimental evidence 
sketched in Section 2 within a rational choice framework. Two main approaches can be 
distinguished. The first approach assumes that at least some agents have “social preferences”, i.e., 
the utility function of these agents does not only depend on the own material payoff but also on 
how much the other players receive. Given these social preferences all agents are assumed to 
behave perfectly rational and the well known concepts of traditional utility and game theory can 
be applied to analyze optimal behavior and to characterize equilibrium outcomes in experimental 
games. The second approach focuses on “intention-based reciprocity”. This approach assumes 
that a player cares about the intentions of her opponent. If she feels treated kindly, she wants to 
return the favor and be nice to her opponent. If she feels treated badly, she wants to hurt her 
opponent. Thus, in this approach it is crucial how a player interprets the behavior of the other 
players. This cannot be captured by traditional game theory but requires the framework of  
psychological game theory. 
                                                
9 Andreoni and Miller (1993) also report that in Prisonners‘ Dilemmas increases in the probability of staying together 
or meeting the same partner again increase cooperation rates.  
10 An exemption is the recent paper by Cooper and Stockman (1999) that combines reenforcement learning with a 
model of social preferences and the paper by Costa-Gomes and Zauner (1999). 
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The starting point of both of these approaches is to make rather specific assumptions on 
the utility functions of the players. Alternatively, one could start from a general preference 
relation and ask what kind of axioms are necessary and sufficient to generate utility functions 
with certain properties. Axiomatic approaches are discussed at the end of this section. 
 
3.1 Social Preferences 
Classical utility theory assumes that a decision maker has preferences over allocations of material 
outcomes (e.g. goods) and that these preferences satisfy some “rationality” o
requirements, such as completeness and transitivity. However, in almost all applications this 
fairly general framework is interpreted much more narrowly by implicitly assuming that the 
decision maker only cares about one aspect of an allocation, namely the material resources that 
are allocated to her. Models of social preferences assume, in contrast, that the decision maker 
may also care about how much material resources are allocated to others.  
Somewhat more formally, let {1,2,...,N} denote a set of individuals and x=(x1,x2,...,x N) 
denote an allocation of physical resources out of some set X of feasible allocations, where xi 
denotes the material resources allocated to person i. The self-interest hypothesis says that the 
utility of individual i depends on xi only. We will say that individual i has social preferences  if 
for any given xi person i's utility is affected by variations of xj, j¹i. Of course, simply assuming 
that the utility of individual i may be any function of the total allocation is too general because it 
does not yield any empirically testable restrictions on observed behavior. In the following we will 
discuss several models of social preferences, each of which assumes that the preferences of an 
individual depend on xj, j¹i, in a different way. 
 
3.1.1 Altruism 
A person is altruistic, if the first partial derivatives of u(x1,...,xN) with respect to x1,...,xN are 
strictly positive, i.e., if her utility increases with the well being of other people.11 The hypothesis 
that people are altruistic has a long tradition in economics and has been used to explain charitable 
donations and the voluntary provision of public goods (see, e.g., Becker, 1974). 
                                                
11 The Encyclopaedia Britannica (1998, 15th edition) defines an altruistic agent as someone who feels the obligation 
“to further the pleasures and alleviate the pains of other people”. Note that our definition of altruism differs 
somewhat from the definition used in moral philosophy, where “altruism” requires a moral agent to be concerned 
only about the welfare of others and not about his own happiness. 
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Clearly, the simplest game to elicit altruistic preferences, is the Dictator Game. Adreoni 
and Miller (2000) conducted a series of DG experiments in which one agent could allocate 
“tokens” between herself and another agent for a series of different budgets. The tokens were 
exchanged into money at different rates for the two agents and the different budgets. Let Ui(x1,x2) 
denote subject i's utility function representing her preferences over monetary allocations (x1,x2). 
In a first step Adreoni and Miller check for violations of the General Axiom of Revealed 
Preference (GARP) and find that almost all subjects behaved consistently and passed this basic 
rationality check. Then they classify the subjects into three main groups. They find that about 30 
percent of the subjects give tokens to the other party in a fashion that equalizes the monetary 
payoffs between players. The behavior of 20 percent of the subjects can be explained by a utility 
function in which x1 and x2 are perfect substitutes, i.e., these subjects seem to have maximized the 
(weighted) sum of the monetary payoffs. However, there are also almost 50 percent of the 
subjects who behaved “selfishly” and did not give any significant amounts to the other party. 
Andreoni and Miller (2000, p.23) conclude that altruistic behavior exists and that it is consistent 
with rationality, but also that individuals are heterogeneous.  
Charness and Rabin (2000) consider a specific form of altruism which they call quasi-
maximin preferences. They start from a “disinterested social welfare function” which is a convex 
combination of Rawls' maximin criterion and a utilitarian welfare function:  
W(x1,x2,...,x N)=d×min{x1,...,xN}+(1-d)×(x1+...+xN) 
where dÎ(0,1) is a parameter reflecting the weight that is put on the maximin criterion. The 
utility function of an individual is then given by a convex combination of his own monetary 
payoff and the above social welfare function:12 
Ui(x1,x2,...,xN)=(1-g)x1+g[d×min{x1,...,xN}+(1-d)×(x1+...+xN)] . 
In the two player case this boils down to  
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12 Note that Charness and Rabin do not normalize payoffs with respect to N. Thus, if the group size changes, and the 
parameters d and g are assumed to be constant, the importance of the maximin term in relation to the player's own 
material payoff changes.  
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Note that the marginal rate of substitution between xi and xj is smaller if xi<xj. Hence, the 
decision maker cares about the well being of the other person, but less so if the other person is 
better off than she is. 
Altruism in general and quasi-maximin preferences, in particular, can explain positive acts 
to other players, such as giving in Dictator Games, voluntary contributions in Public Good 
Games, and the kind behavior of Responders in trust and Gift Exchange Games,13 but it is clearly 
inconsistent with the fact that in some experiments subjects try to retaliate and hurt other subjects 
even if this is costly for them (as in the ultimatum game or a public good game with 
punishments). This is why Charness and Rabin augment quasi-maximin preferences by 
incorporating reciprocity (see Section 3.2.3 below). 
 
3.1.2 Relative Income and Envy 
An alternative hypothesis is that subjects are concerned not only about the absolute amount of 
money they receive but also about their relative standing compared to others. This “relative 
income hypothesis” has a long tradition in economics and goes back at least to Veblen (1922). 
Bolton (1991) formalized this idea in the context of an experimental bargaining game between 
two players and assumed that Ui(xi,xj)=ui(xi,xi/xj),  where u(×,×)  is strictly increasing in its first 
argument and where the partial derivative with respect to xi/xj is strictly positive for  xi<xj and 
equal to 0 for xi³xj. Thus, agent i suffers if she gets less than player j, but she does not care about 
player j if she is better off herself. Note that this utility function implies that ¶Ui/¶ xj£0, just the 
opposite of altruism. Hence, while this utility function is consistent with the behavior in the 
bargaining games considered by Bolton, it fails to explain giving in dictator, gift exchange and 
trust games or voluntary contributions in public good games. The same problem arises in the 
envy-approach of Kirchsteiger (1994). 
 
                                                
13 However, even in these games altruism has some implausible implications. For example, in a public good context, 
altruism implies that if the government provides part of the public good (financed by taxes) then every Dollar 
provided by the government “crowds out” one Dollar of private, voluntary contributions. This “neutrality property” 
holds quite generally (Bernheim, 1986). However, it is in contrast to the empirical evidence reporting that the actual 
crowding out is rather small. This has lead some researchers to include the pleasure of giving (a “warm glow effect”) 
in the utility function (Andreoni, 1989). 
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3.1.3 Inequity Aversion 
The preceding approaches assumed that utility is either monotonically increasing or 
monotonically decreasing in the well being of other players. Fehr and Schmidt (1999) assume 
that a player is altruistic towards other players if their material payoffs are below an equitable 
benchmark, but she feels envy when the material payoffs of the other players exceed this level.14 
In most experiments it is natural to assume that an equitable allocation is an equal monetary 
payoff for all players. Fehr and Schmidt consider the simplest utility function capturing this idea. 
Ui(x1,...,xN) = xi  - [ai/(N-1)]maxSj¹i{xj-xi,0} - [bi/(N-1)]maxSj¹i{xi–xj,0}. 
with bi£ai and bi£1. Note that ¶Ui/¶ xj³0 if and only if xi³xj. Note also that the disutility from 
inequality is larger if another person is better off than player i than if another person is worse off 
(ai³bi).  
This utility function can rationalize positive and negative actions towards other players. It 
is consistent with giving in dictator, gift exchange and trust games, and with the rejection of low 
offers in ultimatum games. It can also explain voluntary contributions in public good games and  
the costly punishment of free-riders. 
A second important ingredient of this model is the assumption that individuals are 
heterogeneous. If all people were alike, it would be difficult to explain why we observe that 
people sometimes resist “unfair” outcomes or manage to cooperate even though it is a dominant 
strategy for a selfish person not to do so, while in other environments fairness concerns or the 
desire to cooperate do not seem to have much of an effect. Fehr-Schmidt show that the interaction 
of the distribution of types with the strategic environment explains why in some situations very 
unequal outcomes are obtained while in other situations very egalitarian outcomes prevail. For 
example, in certain competitive environments (see, e.g., the ultimatum game with Proposer 
competition in Section 5.1) even a population that consists only of very fair types (high a’s and 
b’s) cannot prevent very uneven outcomes. The reason is that none of the inequity averse players 
can enforce a more equitable outcome through her own actions. In contrast, in a public good 
game with punishment, a small fraction of inequity averse players is sufficient to credibly 
threaten that free riders will be punished which induces selfish players to contribute to the public 
good. 
                                                
14 Daughety (1994) and Fehr, Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1998) also assume that a player values the payoff of reference 
agents positively, if she is relatively better off, while she values the others‘ payoff negatively, if she is relatively 
worse off.  
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Using the data that is available from many experiments on the ultimatum game, Fehr and 
Schmidt calibrate the distribution of a and b in the population. Keeping this distribution constant, 
they show that their model yields quantitatively accurate predictions across many bargaining, 
market and co-operation games.15 
Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) independently developed a similar model of inequity 
aversion. They also show that their model can explain a wide variety of seemingly puzzling 
evidence like, e.g., giving in DGs and GEGs and rejections in UGs. In their model the utility 
function is given by  
Ui = Ui(xi,si) 
where  
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For any given si, the utility function is assumed to be weakly increasing and concave in player i's 
own material payoff xi. Furthermore, for any given xi, the utility function is strictly concave in 
player i's share of total income, si, and obtains a maximum at si=1/N.16 Bolton and Ockenfels do 
not pin down a specific functional form, so their utility function is more flexible. However, this 
also makes it more difficult to get closed form solutions and quantitative predictions for the 
outcomes of many experiments. It also imposes less discipline on the researcher not to adjust the 
utility function to a specific set of data. 
For two-player-games Fehr-Schmidt and Bolton-Ockenfels often yield qualitatively 
similar results. With more than two players there are some interesting differences. In this case 
                                                
15 One drawback of the piece-wise linear utility function employed by Fehr and Schmidt is that it implies corner 
solutions for some games where interior solutions are frequently observed. For example, in the dictator game, a 
decision maker with a Fehr-Schmidt utility function would either give nothing (if her b<0.5 ) or share the pie equally 
(if b>0.5 ). Giving away a fraction that is strictly in between 0 and 0.5 is optimal only in the non-generic case where 
b=0.5 . However, this problem can be avoided by assuming non-linear inequity aversion. 
16 This specification of the utility function has the disadvantage that it is not independent of a shift in payoffs. 
Consider, for example, a dictator game in which the dictator has to divide X Dollars. Note that this is a constant sum 
game because  x1+x2 º X. If we reduce the sum of payoffs by X, i.e., if the dictator can take away money from her 
opponent or give to him out of her own pocket, then x1+x2 = 0 for any decision of the dictator and thus we always 
have s1=s2=1/2. Therefore, the theory makes the implausible prediction that, in contrast to the game where x1+x2 = 
X > 0, all dictators should take as much money from their opponent as possible. A related problem has been noted by 
Camerer (1999, p. 61). Suppose that the ultimatum game is modified as follows: If the Responder rejects a proposal 
the Proposer receives a small amount e>0 while the Responder receives zero. In this game the rejection of a positive 
offer implies s=0 while acceptance implies s>0. Thus, the Responder never rejects any positive offer no matter how 
small e>0. 
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Fehr and Schmidt assume that a player compares herself to each of her opponents separately. 
This implies, that her behavior towards an opponent depends on the income difference towards 
this person. In contrast, Bolton and Ockenfels assume that the decision maker is not concerned 
about each individual opponent but only about the average income of all players. Thus, whether 
¶Ui/¶xj is positive or negative in the Bolton-Ockenfels model does not depend on j's relative 
position towards i, but rather on how well i does as compared to the average. If xi is below the 
average, then i would like to reduce j's income even if j has a much lower income than i herself. 
On the other hand, if i is doing better than the average, then she is prepared to give to j even if j is 
much better off than i.17  
 
3.1.4   Altruism and Spitefulness 
Levine (1998) offers a different solution to explain giving in some games and punishing in 
others. Consider the utility function  
Ui=x i+Sj¹ixj(ai+laj)/(1+l)   
where 0£l£1 and -1<ai<1 for all iÎ{1,...,N}. Suppose first that l=0. In this case the utility 
function reduces to Ui=x i+ai Sj¹ixj.  If ai>0, then person i is an altruist who wants to promote the 
well being of other people, if ai<0, then player i is spiteful. While this utility function would be 
able to explain why some people contribute in public good games and why some (other) people 
reject positive offers in the ultimatum game, it cannot explain why the same person who is 
altruistic in one setting is spiteful in another. To deal with this problem, suppose that  l>0. In this 
case an altruistic player i (with ai>0) feels more altruistic towards another altruist than towards a 
spiteful person. In fact, if -laj>ai player i may behave spitefully herself. In most experiments, 
where there is anonymous interaction, the players do not know the parameter aj of their 
opponents and have to form beliefs about them. Thus, any sequential game becomes a signaling 
game in which beliefs about the other players' types are crucially important to determine optimal 
strategies. This may give rise to a multiplicity of signaling equilibria. 
Levine uses the data from the ultimatum game to calibrate the distribution of a and to 
estimate  l (which is assumed to be the same for all players). He shows that with these 
parameters the model can reasonably fit the data on centipete games, market games, and public 
good games. However, because ai<1, the model cannot explain positive giving in the dictator 
game.  
                                                
17 See Camerer (1999) and Section 4.1 for a more extensive comparison of these two approaches.  
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3.2   Models of Intention-Based Reciprocity 
Models of social preferences share a common weakness. They assume that players are only 
concerned about the distributional consequences of their acts but not about the intentions that 
lead their opponents to choose these acts. To see that this may be a problem consider the 
following two “mini-ultimatum games” in which the strategy set of the Proposer is restricted. In 
the first condition the Proposer can choose between a 50:50 and an 80:20 split. In the second 
condition the Proposer must choose between an 80:20 and a 20:80 division of the pie. All theories 
that look only at the distributional consequences must predict that if a Responder rejects the 
80:20 split in the first condition, then she must also reject this offer in the second condition. 
However, in the second condition a fair division of the pie was not feasible and so the Responder 
may be more inclined to accept this offer as compared to the first treatment where the Proposer 
could have split the pie evenly but chose not to do so. In fact, Falk, Fehr and Fischbacher (2000a) 
report that the 80:20 split is rejected significantly less often under the second condition.18 This is 
inconsistent with any theory of social preferences that rely only on preferences over income 
distributions. 
 
3.2.1   Fairness Equilibrium 
In a pioneering article, Rabin (1993) starts from the observation that our behavior is often a 
reaction to the (expected) intentions of other people. If we feel that another person has been kind 
to us, we often have a desire to be kind as well. If we feel that somebody wanted to hurt us, we 
often have the desire to retaliate even if this is personally costly. 
In order to model intentions explicitly, Rabin departs from traditional game theory and 
adopts the concept of “psychological game theory” that had been introduced by Geanakoplos, 
Pearce and Stacchetti (1989). In psychological game theory, utilities do not only depend on 
terminal-node payoffs but also on players' beliefs. Rabin restricts attention to two-player, normal 
form games. Let A1 and A2 denote the (mixed) strategy sets for players 1 and 2, respectively, and 
let xi: A1 A´2®IR  be player i's material payoff function. 
                                                
18 This criticism does not necessarily apply to Levine (1998). In his model, offering 80:20 may be interpreted as a 
signal that the Proposer is spiteful if the 50:50 split was available, and may be differently interpreted if the 50:50 
split was not available. However, if a player knows the type of her opponent, her behavior is independent of what the 
opponent does to her and of why he does it to her. 
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We now have to define (hierarchies of) beliefs over strategies. Let aiÎAi denote a strategy 
of player i. When i chooses her strategy she must have some belief about the strategy to be 
chosen by player j. In all of the following iÎ{1,2} and j=3-i. Let bj denote player i's belief about 
what player j is going to do. Furthermore, in order to rationalize her expectation bj, player i must 
have some belief about what player j believes that player i is going to do. This belief about beliefs 
is denoted by ci. The hierarchy of beliefs could be continued ad infinitum, but the first two levels 
of beliefs are sufficient to define reciprocal preferences. 
Rabin starts with a “kindness function”, fi(ai,bj), which measures how kind player i is to 
player j. If player i believes that her opponent chooses strategy bj, then she chooses effectively 
her opponents payoff out of the set [xjl(bj),xjh(bj)] where xjl(bj) (x jh(bj)) is the lowest (highest) 
payoff of player j that can be induced by player i if j chooses bj. According to Rabin, a “fair” or 
“equitable” payoff for player j, xjf(bj), is just the average of the lowest and highest payoffs 
(excluding Pareto-dominated payoffs, however). Note that this “fair” payoff is independent of the 
payoff of player i. The kindness of player i towards player j is measured by the difference 
between the actual payoff she gives to player j and the “fair” payoff, relative to the whole range 
of feasible payoffs:19 
fi(ai,bj)º[xj(bj,ai)-xjf(bj)]/[x jh(bj)-xjl(bj)] 
with j=3-i and fi(ai,  bj)=0 if xjh(bj)-xjl(bj)=0.  Note that fi(ai,  bj)>0  if and only if player i gives 
player j more than the “fair” payoff. 
Finally, we have to define player i's belief about how kind she is being treated by player j. 
This is defined in  exactly the same manner, but beliefs have to move up one level. Thus, if 
player i beliefs that player j chooses bj and if she believes that player j believes that i chooses ci, 
then player i perceives player j's kindness as given by: 
fj’(bj,ci)º[xi(ci,bj)–xif(ci)]/[x ih(ci)–xil(ci)] 
with j=3-i and fj(bj, ci)=0 if xih(ci)–xil(ci) = 0. These kindness functions can now be used to define 
a player's utility function:  
Ui(a,bj,ci)=x i(a, bj)+fj’(bj, ci)[1+fi(ai,bj)] , 
                                                
19 A disturbing feature of Rabin's formulation is that he excludes Pareto-dominated payoffs in the definition of the 
“fair” payoff, but not in the denominator of the kindness term. Thus, adding a Pareto-dominated strategy for player j 
would not affect the fair payoff but it would reduce the kindness term. 
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where a=(a1,a2). Note that if player j is perceived to be unkind (fj’(×)<0), player i wants to be as 
unkind as possible, too. On the other hand, if fj’(×)  is positive, player i gets some additional utility 
from being kind to player j as well. Note also, that the kindness terms have no dimension and that 
they must lie in the interval [-1,0.5]. Thus, the utility function is sensitive to positive affine 
transformations. Furthermore, the kindness term becomes less and less important the higher the 
material payoffs are. 
A “fairness equilibrium” is an equilibrium in a psychological game with these payoff 
functions, i.e., a pair of strategies (a1,a2) that are mutually best responses to each other and a set 
of rational expectations b=(b1,b2) and c=(c1,c2) that are consistent with equilibrium play.  
Rabin’s theory is important because it was the first contribution that made the notion of 
reciprocity precise and explored the consequences of reciprocal behavior. The model provides 
several interesting insights, but it is not well suited for predictive purposes. It is consistent with 
rejections in the UG but there exist many other unreasonable equilibria including equilibria in 
which the Responders receives more than 50 percent of the pie. The multiplicity of equilibria is a 
general feature of Rabin’s model. If material payoffs are sufficiently small so that psychological 
payoffs matter, then there are always multiple equilibria. In particular, there is one equilibrium in 
which both players are nice to each other and one in which they are nasty. Both equilibria are 
supported by self-fulfilling prophecies, so it is difficult to predict which equilibrium is going to 
be played.  
The theory also predicts that players do not undertake kind actions unless others have 
shown their kind intentions. Suppose, for example, that in the prisoners' dilemma player 2 has no 
choice but is forced to cooperate. If player 1 knows this, then - according to Rabin's theory - she 
will interpret player 2's cooperation as “neutral” (f2’(×)=0). Thus, she will only look at her 
material payoffs and will defect. This contrasts with models inequity aversion where player 2 
would co-operate irrespective of the reason for player 1’s co-operation. We will discuss the 
experimental evidence that can be used to discriminate between the different approaches in 
Section 4 below. 
 
3.2.2  Intentions in Sequential Games 
Rabin's theory has been defined only for two person, normal form games. If the theory is applied 
to the normal form of simple sequential games, some very implausible equilibria may arise. For 
example, in the sequential prisoners' dilemma, unconditional cooperation of the second player is 
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part of a “fairness” equilibrium. The reason is that Rabin's equilibrium notion does not force 
player 2 to behave optimally off the equilibrium path. 
In a subsequent paper, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (1998) generalized Rabin's theory to 
N-person extensive form games for which they introduce the notion of a “Sequential Reciprocity 
Equilibrium” (SRE). The main innovation is to keep track of beliefs about intentions as the game 
evolves. In particular, it has to be specified how beliefs about intentions are formed off the 
equilibrium path. Given this system of beliefs, strategies have to form a fairness equilibrium in 
every proper subgame.20 Applying their model to several examples Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 
show that conditional cooperation in the prisoners' dilemma is a SRE. They also show that it can 
be a SRE in the ultimatum game that the Proposer makes an offer that is rejected by the 
Responder with certainty. This is an equilibrium because both players believe that the other party 
wants to hurt them. However, even in these extremely simple sequential games the equilibrium 
analysis is fairly complex, and there are typically many equilibria with different equilibrium 
outcomes due to different self-fulfilling beliefs about intentions. 
 
3.2.3    Merging Intentions and Social Preferences 
Falk and Fischbacher (1999) also generalize Rabin (1993). They consider N-person extensive 
form games and allow for the possibility of incomplete information. Furthermore, they measure 
“kindness” in terms of inequity aversion. A strategy of player j  is perceived to be kind by player 
i if it gives rise to a payoff for player i which is higher than the payoff of player j. Note that this is 
fundamentally different from Rabin and Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger who define “kindness” in 
relation to the feasible payoffs of player i and not in relation to the payoff that player j gets. 
Furthermore, Falk and Fischbacher distinguish whether an unequal distribution could have been 
altered by player j or whether player j was a “dummy player” who is unable to affect the 
distribution by his actions. In the former case the kindness term gets a higher weight than in the 
latter. However, even if player j is a dummy player who has no choice to make, the kindness term 
                                                
20 Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger also suggest several other deviations from Rabin's model. In particular, they measure 
kindness “in proportion to the size of the gift” (i.e. in monetary units). This has the advantage that reciprocity does 
not disappear as the stakes become larger, but it also implies that the kindness term in the utility function has the 
dimension of “money squared” which again makes the utility function sensitive to linear transformations. 
Furthermore, they define “inefficient strategies” (which play an important role in the definition of the kindness term) 
as strategies that yield a weakly lower payoff for all players than some other strategy for all subgames. Rabin (1993) 
defines inefficient strategies as those which yield weakly less on the equilibrium path. However, with more than two 
players in Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (1998) the problem arises that an additional dummy player may render an 
inefficient strategy efficient and might thus affect the size of the kindness term.  
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(which now reflects pure inequity aversion) gets a positive weight. Thus Falk and Fischbacher 
merge intention based reciprocity and inequity aversion. 
Their model is quite complex. At every node where player i  has to move, she has to 
evaluate the kindness of player j which depends on the expected payoff difference between the 
two players and on what player j could have done about this difference. This “kindness term” is 
multiplied by a “reciprocation term”, which is positive if player i is kind to player j and negative 
if i is unkind. The product is further multiplied by an individual reciprocity parameter which 
measures the weight of player i’s desire to reciprocate as compared to his desire to get a higher 
material payoff. These preferences together with the underlying game form define a 
psychological game á la Geanakoplos, Pearce and Stacchetti (1989). A subgame perfect 
psychological Nash equilibrium of this game is called a “reciprocity equilibrium”. 
Falk and Fischbacher show that there are parameter constellations for which their model is 
consistent with the stylized facts of the ultimatum game, the gift exchange game, the dictator 
game, and of public good and prisoners' dilemma games. Furthermore, there are parameter 
constellations that can explain the difference in outcomes if one player moves intentionally and if 
she is a dummy player. Because their model contains variants of a pure intentions based 
reciprocity model (like Rabin) and a pure inequity aversion model (like Fehr and Schmidt or 
Bolton and Ockenfels) as special cases it is possible to get a better fit of the data, but at a 
significant cost in terms of the complexity of the model.  
Another attempt to combine social preferences with intention based reciprocity is due to 
Charness and Rabin (1999). We described their model of quasi-maximin preferences in Section 
3.1.1 already. In a second step they augment these preferences by introducing a demerit profile 
rº(r1,...,rN), where riÎ[0,1] is a measure of how much player i deserves from the point of view 
of all other players. The smaller ri the more does player i count in the utility function of the other 
players. Given a demerit profile r, player i's utility function is given by 
Ui(x1,x2,...,xN|r)=(1-g)xi+g[d×min{xi,minj¹i{xj+drj}}  
+(1-d)×(xi+S j¹imax{1-krj,0}×xj) – fSj¹irjxj] 
where d,k,f³0 are three new parameters of the model. If d=k=f=0, this boils down to the quasi-
maximin preferences describes above. If d and k are large, then player i does not want to promote 
the well being of player j. If f is large, player i may actually want to hurt player j. 
The crucial step is to endogenize the demerit profile r. Charness and Rabin do this by 
comparing player j's strategy to an unanimously agreed upon, exogenously given  “selfless 
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standard” of behavior. The more player j falls short of this standard, the higher is his demerit 
factor rj. 
A “reciprocal fairness equilibrium” (RFE) is a strategy profile and a demerit profile such 
that each player is maximizing his utility function given other players' strategies and given the 
demerit profile that is itself consistent with the profile of strategies. This definition implicitly 
corresponds to a Nash equilibrium of a psychological game as defined by Geanakoplos, Pearce 
and Stacchetti (1989). 
The notion of RFE has several drawbacks that make it almost impossible to use it for the 
analysis of even the simplest experimental games. First of all, the model is incomplete because 
preferences are only defined in equilibrium (i.e., for an equilibrium demerit profile r) and it is 
unclear how to evaluate outcomes out of equilibrium or if there are multiple equilibria. Second, it 
requires that all players have the same utility functions and agree on a “quasi-
welfare function in order to determine the demerit profile r. Finally, the model is so complicated 
and involves so many free parameters that it would be very difficult to test it empirically. 
Charness and Rabin show that if the “selfless standard” is sufficiently small, then every 
RFE corresponds to a Nash equilibrium of the game in which players simply maximize their 
quasi-maximin utility functions. Therefore, in the analysis of the experimental evidence, they 
restrict attention to the much simpler model of quasi-maximin preferences that we discussed in 
Section 3.1.1 above. 
 
3.3  Axiomatic Approaches 
The models considered so far assume very specific utility functions that are either defined on 
(lotteries over) material payoff vectors and/or on beliefs about other players' strategies and other 
players' beliefs. These utility functions are based on psychological plausibility yet most of them 
lack an axiomatic foundation. Segal and Sobel (1999) take the opposite approach and ask what 
kind of axioms generate preferences that can reflect fairness and reciprocity. 
Their starting point is to assume that players have preferences over strategy profiles rather 
than over material allocations. Consider a given two-player game and let Si ,  iÎ{1,2}, denote the 
space of (mixed) strategies of player i. For any strategy profile (s1,s2)ÎS´ S1 let vi(s1,s2) denote 
player i's material payoff function, assuming that these “selfish preferences” satisfy the von 
Neumann-Morgenstern axioms. However, the actual preferences of player i are given by a 
preference relation Di,sj over her own strategies. Note that this preference relation depends on the 
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strategy chosen by player j. Segal and Sobel show that if the preference relation Di,sj satisfies the 
independence axiom and if, for a given sj, player i prefers to get a higher material payoff for 
herself if the payoff of player j is held constant (self interest), then the preferences Di,sj over Si  
can be represented by a utility function of the form21 
ui(si, sj ) = vi(si,sj)+ai,sjvj(si,sj). 
In standard game theory, ai,sjº0. Positive values of this coefficient mean that player i has 
altruistic preferences, negative values of ai sj  mean that she is spitelful. 
Note that the coefficient ai,sj  depends on sj. Therefore, whether a player is altruistic or 
spiteful may depend on the strategy chosen by her opponent, so there is scope to model 
reciprocity. In order to do so, Segal and Sobel introduce an additional axiom, called “reciprocal 
j chooses a strategy sj which player i likes better 
than some other strategy sj’, then player i prefers strategies that give a higher payoff to player j. 
Segal and Sobel show that this axiom implies that the coefficient aisj  varies with sj such that 
(other things being equal) the coefficient increases if and only if player j chooses a “nicer” 
strategy. 
The models of social preferences that we discussed at the beginning of this chapter, in 
particular the models of altruism, relative income, inequity aversion, quasi-maximin preferences, 
and altruism and spitefulness, can all be seen as special cases of a Segal-Sobel utility function. 
Segal and Sobel can also capture some, but not all, aspects of intention based reciprocity. For 
example, in Rabin’s (1993) model a player's utility did not only depend on the strategy chosen by 
her opponent, but also on why he has chosen this strategy. This can be illustrated in the “Battle of 
the Sexes” game. Player 1 may go to boxing, because she expects player 2 to go to boxing, too 
(which is kind of player 2 given that he believes player 1 to go to boxing). Yet, she may also go 
to boxing, because she expects player 2 to go to ballet (which is unkind of player 2 if he believes 
player 1 to go to boxing) and which is punished by the boxing strategy of player 1. This effect 
cannot be captured by Segal and Sobel, because in their framework preferences are defined on 
strategies only. 
Neilson (2000) provides an axiomatic characterization of the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) 
model of inequity aversion. He introduces the axiom of “self-referent separability” which 
requires that if the payoff differences between player i and any subset of all other players remain 
                                                
21 The construction resembles that of Harsanyi's (1955) “utilitarian” social welfare function S ai ui. Note, however, 
that Harsanyi's axiom of Pareto efficiency is stronger than the axiom of self interest employed here. Therefore, the  
ai, sj in Segal and Sobel may be negative. 
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constant, then the preferences of player i should not be affected by the magnitude of these 
differences. Neilson shows that this axiom is equivalent to having a utility function that is 
additively separable in the individual’s own material payoff and the payoff differences to his 
opponents, which is an essential feature of the Fehr-Schmidt model. Neilson also offers a full 
axiomatic characterization of the more specific functional form used by Fehr and Schmidt.  
 
4 Discriminating between Theories of Fairness 
Most theories discussed in Section 3 have been developed during the last few years and the 
evidence to discriminate between these theories is still limited. As we will show, however, the 
available data do exhibit some clear qualitative regularities that give a first indication of the 
advantages and disadvantages of the different theories.22  
 
4.1 Who are the relevant Reference Actors? 
All theories of fairness and reciprocity are based on the idea that actors compare themselves with 
a set of reference actors. To whom do people compare themselves? In bilateral interactions there 
is no ambiguity about who the relevant reference actor is. In multi-person interactions, however, 
the answer is less clear. Most of the  theories that are applicable in the n-person context assume 
that players make comparisons with all other n-1 players in the game. The only exemption is the 
theory of Bolton and Ockenfels (BO). They assume that players compare themselves only with 
the “average" player in the game and do not care about inequities between the other players. In 
this regard the BO approach is inspired by the data of Selten and Ockenfels (1998) and Güth and 
van Damme (1998), which seem to suggest that actors do not care for inequities among the other 
reference agents. It would greatly simplify matters if this aspect of the BO theory were correct.  
One problem with this aspect of the BO approach is that it renders the theory unable to 
explain the punishment pattern in the public good game with punishment. Remember that in this 
experiment the assignment of one punishment point reduces the income of the punished member 
by 3 points. The theory of BO predicts that punishing subjects are indifferent between punishing 
a free-rider and punishing a cooperator. All that matters is whether punishment brings the income 
of the punishing subject closer to the average income in the group and for this purpose the 
                                                
22 This section rests to a large extent on joint work of one of the authors with Armin Falk and Urs Fischbacher (Falk, 
Fehr, Fischbacher 2000a and 2000b, henceforth FFF). In particular, the organization of this section according to the 
questions below and many of the empirical results emerged from this joint project. 
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punishment of a cooperator is equally good as the punishment of a defector. Yet, in contrast to 
this indifference prediction the cooperators predominantly punish the defectors.  
To further test the BO-model, Fehr and Fischbacher (2000) conducted the following 
Third-Party Punishment Game. There are three players, A, B, and C. Player A is endowed with 
100 experimental currency units and must decide how much of the 100 units to give to B who has 
no endowment. Player B is just a dummy player and has no decision power. Player C has an 
endowment of 50 units and can spend this money on the punishment of A after he observes how 
much A gave to B. For any money unit player C spends on punishment the payoff of player A is 
reduced by 3 units.23 Note that without punishment player C is certain to get her fair share of the 
total surplus (50 out of 150 units). Therefore, BO predict that C will never punish. In contrast to 
this prediction players A are, however, punished a lot. The less player A gives to B the more C 
punishes A. For example, if A gives nothing his income is reduced by roughly 30 percent. This 
indicates that many players do care about inequities among other players. Further support for this 
hypothesis comes from Charness and Rabin (2000) who offered player C the choice between the 
payoff allocations (575,575,575) and (900,300,600). Because both allocations give player C the 
fair share of 1/3 of the surplus, BO predict that player C will choose the second allocation which 
gives him a higher absolute payoff. However, 54 percent of the subjects preferred the first 
allocation. Note that the self-interest hypothesis also predicts the second allocation, so one cannot 
conclude that the other 46 percent of the subjects have BO-preferences. A recent paper by Zizzo 
and Oswald (2000) also strongly suggests that subjects care about the inequities among the set of 
references agents.  
It is important to note that theories in which fair-minded subjects have multiple reference 
agents do not necessarily imply that fair subjects take actions in favor of all other reference 
agents. To illustrate this, consider the following three-person UG (Güth and van Damme 1998). 
In this game there is a Proposer, a Responder who can reject or accept the proposal and a passive 
Receiver who can do nothing but collect the amount of money allocated to him. The Proposer 
proposes an allocation (x1,x2,x3) where x1 is the Proposer’s payoff, x2 the Responder’s payoff and 
x3 the Receiver’s payoff. If the Responder rejects, all three players get nothing, otherwise the 
proposed allocation is implemented.  
It turns out that in this game the Proposers allocate substantial fractions of the surplus to 
the Responder but little or nothing to the Receiver. Moreover, Güth and van Damme (p. 230) 
                                                
23 In the experimental instructions the value laden term „punishment“ was not used. The punishment option of player 
C was described in neutral terms by telling subjects that player C could “assign points” to player A that reduced the 
incomes of A and C in the way described above. 
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report that “there is not a single rejection that can clearly be attributed to a low share for the 
dummy (i.e., the Receiver, FS)”. BO take this as evidence in favor of their approach because the 
Proposer and the Responder apparently do not take the Receiver’s interest into account. However, 
this conclusion is premature because it is easy to show that approaches with multiple reference 
agents are fully consistent with the Güth and van Damme data. The point can be demonstrated in 
the context of the Fehr-Schmidt model. Assume for simplicity that the Proposer makes an offer of 
x1=x2=x while the Receiver gets x3<x. It is easy to show that a Responder with FS-preferences 
will never (!) reject such an allocation even if x3 = 0 and even if he is very fair-minded, i.e., has a 
high b-coefficient. To see this note that the utility of the Responder if he accepts is given by U2 = 
x – (b/2)(x – x3) which is positive for all b £ 1, and thus higher than the rejection payoff of zero. 
A similar calculation shows that it takes implausibly high b-values to induce a Proposer to take 
the interests of the Receiver into account.24  
 
4.2 Equality versus Efficiency 
Many models of fairness are based on the definition of a fair or equitable outcome to which 
people compare the available payoff allocations. In experimental games a natural first 
approximation for the relevant reference outcome is the equality of material payoffs. The quasi-
maximin theory of Charness and Rabin assumes instead that subjects care for the total surplus 
accruing to the group. A natural way to study whether there are subjects who want to maximize 
the total surplus is to construct experiments in which the predictions of both theories of inequality 
aversion (BO and FS) are in conflict with surplus maximization. This has been done by Andreoni 
and Miller (2000), Bolle and Kritikos (1998), Andreoni and Vesterlund (forthcoming), Charness 
and Rabin (2000), Cox (2000) and Güth, Kliemt and Ockenfels (2000). Except for the Güth et al. 
paper, these papers indicate that in DG-situations a non-negligible fraction of the subjects is 
willing to give up some of their own money in order to increase total surplus, even if this implies 
that they generate inequality that is to their disadvantage. Andreoni and Miller and Andreoni and 
Vesterlund, for example, conducted DGs with varying prices for transferring money to the 
Receiver. In some conditions the Allocator had to give up less than a Dollar to give the Receiver 
a Dollar, in some conditions the exchange ratio was 1:1, and in some other conditions the 
Allocator had to give up more than one Dollar. In the usual DGs the exchange ratio is 1:1 and 
                                                
24 The Proposers utility is given by U1 = x1 – (b/2)[(x1 – x2) + (x1 – x3)]. If we normalize the surplus to one and take 
into account that x1 + x2 + x3 = 1, U1 = (b/2) + (3/2)x1[(2/3) - b]. Thus, the marginal utility of x1 is positive unless b 
exceeds 2/3. This means that Proposers with b < 2/3 will give the Responders just enough to prevent rejection and, 
since the Responders neglect the interests of the Receivers, nothing to the Receivers.  
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there are virtually no cases in which an Allocator transfers more than 50 percent of the surplus. In 
contrast, in DGs with an exchange ratio of 1:3 (or 1:2) a non-negligible number of subjects makes 
transfers such that they end up with less money than the Receiver. This contradicts BO, FS, and 
Falk and Fischbacher because in these models fair subjects never take actions that give the other 
party more than they get. It is, however, consistent with altruistic preferences or quasi-maximin 
preferences.  
What is the relative importance of this kind of behavior? Andreoni and Vesterlund are 
able to classify subjects in three distinct classes. They report that 44 % of their subjects (N= 141) 
are completely selfish, 35 percent exhibit egalitarian preferences, i.e. they tend to equalize 
payoffs, and 21 percent of the subjects can be classified as surplus maximizers. Charness and 
Rabin report similar results with regard to the fraction of egalitarian subjects in a simple DG 
where the Allocator had to choose between (own, other)-allocations of (400, 400) and (400, 750). 
31 percent of the subjects preferred the egalitarian and 69 percent the surplus maximizing 
allocation. Among the 69 percent there may, however, also be many selfish subjects who no 
longer choose the surplus-maximizing allocation when this decreases their payoff only slightly. 
This is suggested by the DG where the Allocator had to choose between (400, 400) and (375, 
750). Here only 49 percent of surplus-maximizing choices were observed. Charness and Rabin 
also present questionnaire evidence indicating that when the income disparities are greater the 
egalitarian motive gains weight at the cost of the surplus maximization motive. When the 
Allocator faces a choice between (400, 400) and (400, 2000),  62 percent prefer the egalitarian 
allocation.  
The evidence cited in the papers mentioned above indicates that surplus maximization is a 
relevant motive in DGs. This motive has not been included in the prevailing models of inequity 
aversion but it would be straightforward to do this. It should also be remembered that any 
positive transfer in DGs is incompatible with intention based reciprocity models, irrespective of 
the exchange rate. We would like to stress, however, that the DG is different from many 
economically important games and real life situations, because in economic interactions it is 
rarely the case that one player is at the complete mercy of another player. It may well be that in 
situations, where both players have some power to affect the outcome, the surplus maximization 
motive is less important than in DGs. The gift-exchange experiments by Fehr, Kirchsteiger and 
Riedl (1993, 1998) are telling in this regard because they embed a situation that is like a DG into 
an environment with competitive and strategic elements.  
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These experiments exhibit a competitive element because the GEG is embedded into a 
competitive experimental market. The experiments also exhibit a strategic element because the 
Proposers are wage setters and have to take into account the likely effort responses of the 
Responders. Yet, once the Responder has accepted a wage offer, the experiments are similar to a 
DG because, for a given wage, the Responder essentially determines the income distribution and 
the total surplus by his choice of the effort level. The gift exchange experiments are an ideal 
environment to check the robustness of the surplus maximization motive because an increase in 
the effort cost by one unit increases, on average, the total surplus by five units. Therefore, the 
maximal feasible effort level is, in general, also the surplus maximizing effort level. If surplus 
maximization is a robust motive capable of overturning inequity aversion, one would expect that 
many Responders choose effort levels that give the Proposer a higher monetary payoff than the 
Responder.25 Moreover, surplus maximization also means that we should not observe a positive 
correlation between effort and wages because, for a given wage, the maximum feasible effort 
always maximizes the total surplus.26  
However, neither of these implications is supported by the data. Effort levels that give the 
Proposer a higher payoff than the Responder are virtually non-existent. In the overwhelming 
majority of the cases effort is substantially below the maximally feasible level and in less than 
two percent of the cases the Proposer earns a higher payoff than the Responder.27 Moreover, 
almost all subjects who regularly chose non-minimal effort levels exhibited a reciprocal effort-
wage relation. These numbers are in sharp contrast to the 49 percent of the Allocators in Charness 
and Rabin who preferred the (375, 750) allocation over the (400, 400) allocation. One reason for 
the difference across studies is perhaps the fact that it was much cheaper to increase the surplus in 
the Charness-Rabin example. While the surplus increases in the gift exchange experiments on 
average by five units, if the Responder sacrifices one payoff unit, the surplus increases by 14 
units per payoff unit sacrificed in the Charness-Rabin case. This suggests that surplus 
maximization gives rise to a violation of the equality constraint only if surplus increases are 
extremely cheap. A second reason for the behavioral difference may be that, when both players 
have some power to affect the outcome, the motive to increase the surplus is quickly crowded out 
                                                
25 The Responders‘ effort level may, of course, also  be affected by the intentions of the Proposer. For example, 
paying a high wage may signal fair intentions which may increase the effort level. Yet, since this tends to raise effort 
levels, we would have even stronger evidence against the surplus-maximization hypothesis, if we observe little or no 
effort choices that give the Proposer a higher payoff than the Responder.  
26 There are degenerate cases in which this is not true.  
27 The total number of effort choices is N = 480 in these experiments, i.e., the results are not an artefact of a low 
number of observations.  
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by other considerations. This reason is quite plausible insofar as the outcomes in DGs themselves 
are notoriously non-robust.  
While the experimental results on UGs, GEGs or PGGs are fairly robust, the DG seems to 
be a rather fragile situation in which minor factors can have large effects. Cox (2000), e. g., 
reports, that in his DGs 100 percent of all subjects transferred positive amounts.28 This result 
contrasts sharply with many other games, including the games in Charness and Rabin and many 
other DGs. To indicate the other extreme, Eichenberger and Oberholzer (1998), Hoffman, 
McCabe, Shachat and Smith (1994) and List and Cherry (2000) report on DGs with extremely 
low transfers.29 Likewise, in the Impunity Game of Bolton and Zwick (1995), which is very close 
but not identical to a DG, the vast majority of Proposers did not shy away from making very 
unfair offers. The Impunity Game differs from the DG only insofar as the Responder can reject 
an offer; however, the rejection destroys only the Responder’s but not the Proposer’s payoff. The 
notorious non-robustness of outcomes in situations resembling the DG indicates that one should 
be very careful in generalizing the results found in these situations to other games. Testing 
theories of social preferences in DGs is a bit like testing the law of gravity with a table tennis 
ball. In both situations minor unobserved distortions can have large effects. Therefore, we believe 
that it is necessary to show that the same motivational forces that are inferred from DGs are also 
behaviorally relevant in economically more important games. One way to do this is to apply the 
theories that have been constructed on the basis of DG-experiments to predict outcomes in other 
games. With the exemption of Andreoni and Miller (2000) this has not yet been done.  
Andreoni and Miller (2000) estimate utility functions based on the results of their DG-
experiments and use them to predict co-operation behavior in a standard PGG. They predict 
behavior in period one of these games, where co-operation is often quite high, rather well. 
However, their predictions are far away from final period outcomes, where co-operation is 
typically very low. In our view the low co-operation rates in the final period of repeated public 
good games constitutes a strong challenge for models that rely exclusively on altruistic or 
surplus-maximizing preferences. Why should a subject with a stable preference for the payoff of 
others or the payoff of the whole group contribute much less in the final period compared to the 
first period? Models of inequity aversion and intention-based or type-based reciprocity models 
                                                
28 In Cox’s experiment both players had an endowment of 10 and the Allocator could transfer his endowment to the 
Receiver where the transferred amount was trippled by the experimenter.  
29 In Eichenberger and Oberholzer (1998) almost 90 percent of the subjects gave nothing. In Hoffman et al. (1992) 
64 percent gave nothing and 19 percent gave between 1 and 10 percent. In List and Cherry subjects earned their 
endowment in a quiz. Then they played the DG. Roughly 90 percent of the Allocators transferred nothing to the 
Receivers.  
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provide a plausible explanation for this behavior. All of these models predict that fair subjects 
make their co-operation contingent on the co-operation of others. Thus, if the fair subjects realize 
that there are sufficiently many selfish decisions in the course of a PGG experiment, they cease to 
cooperate as well.  
 
4.3 Revenge versus Inequity Reduction 
Subjects with altruistic and quasi-maximin preferences do not take actions that reduce other 
subjects’ payoffs. Yet, this is frequently observed in many important games. Models of inequity 
aversion account for this by assuming that the payoff reduction is motivated by a desire to reduce 
disadvantageous inequality. In intention-based reciprocity models and in Levine (1998) subjects  
punish if they observe an action that is perceived to be unfair or that reveals that the opponent is 
spiteful. In these models players want to reduce the opponent’s payoff irrespective of whether 
they are better or worse off than the opponent and irrespective of whether they can change 
income shares or income differences. Furthermore, intention-based theories predict that in games 
in which no intention can be expressed there will be no punishment. Therefore, a clean way to 
test for the relevance of intentions is to conduct control treatments in which choices are made 
through a random device or through some neutral and disinterested third party.  
Blount (1995) was the first who applied this idea to the UG. Blount compared the 
rejection rate in the usual UG to the rejection rates in UGs in which either a computer generated a 
random offer or a third party made the offer. Because in the random offer condition and the third 
party condition a low offer cannot be attributed to the greedy intentions of the Proposer, 
intention-based theories predict a rejection rate of zero in these conditions, while theories of 
inequity aversion still allow for positive rejection rates. Levine’s theory is also consistent with 
positive rejection rates in these conditions, but his theory predicts a decrease in the rejection rate 
relative to the usual condition, because low offers made by humans reveal that the type who made 
the offer is spiteful which can trigger a spiteful response. Blount indeed observes a significant 
and substantial reduction in the acceptance thresholds of the Responders in the random offer 
condition but not in the third party condition. Thus, the result of the random offer condition is 
consistent with intention- and type based models while the result of the third party condition is 
inconsistent with the motives captured by these models. Yet, these puzzling results may be due to 
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some problematic features in Bount’s experiments.30 Subsequently, Offermann (1999) and FFF 
(2000b) conducted further experiments with computerized offers but without the other worrisome 
features in Blount. In particular, in these experiments the Responders knew that a rejection 
affects the payoff of a real, human “Proposer”. Offerman finds that subjects are 67 percent more 
likely to reduce the opponent’s payoff when the opponent made an intentional hurtful choice 
compared to a situation where a computer made the hurtful choice.  
FFF (2000b) conducted an experiment, invented by Abbink, Irlenbusch and Renner 
(2000), that simultaneously allows for the examination of positive and negative reciprocity. In 
this game player A can give player B any integer amount of money g Î [0, 6] or, alternatively, 
she can take away from B any integer amount of money t Î [1, 6]. In case of g > 0 the 
experimenter triples g so that B receives 3g. If player A takes away t, player A gets t and player B 
loses t. After player B observes g or t, she can pay A an integer reward r Î [0, 18] or she can 
reduce A’s income by making an investment i Î [1, 6]. A reward transfers one money unit from 
B to A. An investment i costs B exactly i but reduces A’s income by 3i. This game was played in 
a random choice condition and in a human choice condition. It turns out that when the choices are 
made by a human player A players B invest significantly more into payoff reductions for all t Î 
[1, 6]. However, as in Blount and Offerman payoff reductions also occur when the computer 
makes a hurtful choice. 
Kagel, Kim and Moser (1996) provide further support that intentions play a role for 
payoff-reducing behavior. In their experiments subjects bargained over 100 chips in an UG. They 
conducted several treatments that varied the money value of the chips and the information 
provided about the money value. For example, in one treatment the Proposers received three 
times more money per chip than the Responders, i.e., the equal money split requires that the 
Responders receive 75 chips. If the Responders know that the Proposers know the different 
money values of the chips they reject unequal money splits much more frequently than if the 
Responders know that the Proposers do not know the different money values of the chips. Thus, 
knowingly unequal proposals were rejected at higher rates than unintentional unequal proposals.  
Another way to test for the relevance of intention-based or type-based punishments is to 
examine situations in which the subjects cannot increase their relative share or decrease payoff 
                                                
30 Blount’s results may be affected by the fact that subjects (in two of three treatments) had to make decisions as a 
Proposer and as a responder before they knew their actual roles. After subjects had made their decisions in both 
roles, the role for which they received payments was determined randomly. In one of Blount's treatments deception 
was involved. Subjects believed that there were Proposers although in fact the experimenters made the proposals. All 
subjects in this condition were "randomly" assigned to the responder role. In this treatment subjects also were not 
paid according to their decisions but they received a flat fee instead. 
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differences. FFF (2000a) report the results of UGs and PGGs with punishment that have this 
feature. In the first (standard) treatment of the UG the Proposers could propose a (5,5)-or an 
(8,2)-split of the surplus (the first number represents the Proposer’s payoff). In case of a rejection 
both players received zero. In the second treatment the Proposers had the same options but a 
rejection now meant that the payoff was reduced for both players by 2 units. The BO- as well as 
the FS-model predict, therefore, that there will be no rejections in the second treatment while 
intention-based and type-based models predict that punishments will occur. It turns out that the 
rejection rate of the (8,2)-offer is 56 percent in the first and 19 percent in the second treatment. 
Thus, roughly one third (19/57) of the rejections are consistent with a pure taste for punishment 
as conceptualized in intention- and type-based models.31  
FFF (2000a) also report the results of PGGs with punishment in which the punishing 
subjects could not change the payoff difference between themselves and the punished subject. In 
one of their treatments subjects had to pay one money unit in order to reduce the payoff of 
another group member by one unit. Thus, BO and FS both predict that there will be no 
punishment at all in this condition. In a second treatment investing one unit into punishment 
reduced the payoff of the punished group member by three units. 
FFF report that 51 percent of all subjects (N = 93) cooperate which is still compatible with 
both BO and FS. However, another 51 percent of all cooperators punish the defectors. They 
invest on average 4.8 money units into punishment. Thus, 25 percent of the subjects punish free-
riding which is incompatible with BO and FS. To evaluate the relative importance of this amount 
of punishment we have to compare these results with the results of the second condition. In the 
second condition 61 percent of all subjects (N = 120) cooperate and 59 percent of them punish 
the defectors (by imposing a punishment of 5.7 on average). Thus, the overall percentage of 
subjects who punish the defectors in the second condition is 36 percent. This suggests that a 
rather large fraction (i.e., 25/36) of the overall amount of punishment is not consistent with BO 
and FS. 
Taken together the evidence from Blount (1995), Offerman (1999) and FFF (2000b) 
indicates that the motive to punish unfair intentions or unfair types plays an important role. 
Although the evidence provided by the initial study of Blount was mixed, the subsequent studies 
indicate a clear role of these motives. However, the evidence also suggests that inequity aversion 
plays an additional, non-negligible role. The evidence from the experiments in FFF (2000a) 
                                                
31 Ahlert, Crüger and Güth (1999) also report a significant amount of punishment in UGs where the Responders 
cannot change the payoff difference. However, since they do not have a control treatment it is not possible to say 
something about the relative importance of this kind of punishment.  
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suggests that many subjects who reduce the payoff of other players do not have the desire to 
change the equitability of the payoff allocation. Instead, a large fraction of these subjects seems 
to be driven by the desire to punish, i.e., a desire to hurt the other player. It is worthwhile to point 
out that this desire to hurt the other players, while consistent with intention- and type based 
models of reciprocity, does not necessarily constitute evidence in favor of these models. The 
reason is that the desire to reduce the payoff of other players may also be triggered by an unfair 
payoff allocation per se. 32  
 
4.4 Does Kindness trigger Rewards? 
Do intention- and type-based theories of fairness equally well in the domain of rewarding 
behavior? It turns out that the evidence in this domain is much more mixed. Some experimental 
results suggest that rewarding behavior is almost unaffected by these motives. Other results 
indicate some minor role and only one paper finds an unambiguous positive effect of intention- or 
type-based reciprocity.  
Intention-based theories predict that people are generous only if they have been treated 
kindly, i.e., if the first-mover has signaled a fair intention. Levine’s theory is similar in this regard 
because generous actions are more likely if the first mover reveals that she is an altruistic type. 
However, in contrast to the intention-based approaches Levine’s approach is also compatible with 
unconditional giving if it is sufficiently surplus-enhancing.  
Neither intention- nor type-based reciprocity can explain positive transfers in the DG. 
Moreover, Charness (1996), Bolton, Brandts and Ockenfels (1998), Offerman (1999), Cox (2000) 
and Charness and Rabin (2000) provide further evidence that intentions do not play a big role for 
rewarding behavior. Charness (1996) conducted GEGs in a random choice condition and a 
human choice condition. Intention-based theories predict that in the random choice condition the 
Responders will not put forward more than the minimal effort level irrespective of the wage level 
because high wage offers are due to chance and not to kind intentions. In the human choice 
condition higher wages indicate a higher degree of kindness and, therefore, a positive correlation 
between wages and effort is predicted. Levine’s theory allows, in principle, for a positive 
                                                
32 Assume that fair subjects have the following utility function: ui = xi + ai[1/(n-1)][Sj ¹ i b(xi - xj)v(xj)], where ai 
measures the strength of player i’s non-pecuniary preference, and v(pj) is an increasing function of player j’s material 
payoff. b(xi - xj) is positive if xi - xj > 0 and negative if xi - xj < 0. Thus, a state of inequality triggers the desire to 
reduce or increase the other players’ payoff. In this regard the above utility function is similar to the preference 
assumption in FS. Yet, in contrast to FS, the aim of player i is no longer the reduction of the payoff difference. 
Instead, player i just wants to reduce or increase the other player’s payoff depending on the sign of b.  
  35
correlation between wages and effort in both conditions, because an increase in effort benefits the 
Proposer much more than they cost the Responder. However, the correlation should be much 
stronger in the human choice condition due to the type-revealing effect of high wages. Charness 
finds a significantly positive correlation in the random choice condition. In the human choice 
condition effort is only slightly lower at low wages and equally high at high wages. This 
indicates, if anything, only a minor role for intention and type-driven behavior. The best 
interpretation is probably that inequity aversion or quasi-maximin preferences induce non-
minimal effort levels in this setting. In addition, negative reciprocity kicks in at low wages which 
explains the lower effort levels in the human choice condition.  
Cox (2000) tries to isolate rewarding responses in the context of a TG by using a related 
DG as a control condition. In the TG Cox observes a baseline level of Responder transfers back 
to the Proposer. To isolate the relevance of intention-driven responses he conducts a DG in which 
the distribution of endowments is identical to the distribution of material payoffs after the 
Proposers’ choices in the TG. Thus, both in the TG and in the DG the Responders face exactly 
the same distributions of material payoffs but in the TG this distribution has been caused 
intentionally by the Proposers while in the DG the distribution is predetermined by the 
experimenter. In Cox’ DG the motive of rewarding kindness can, therefore, play no role and 
intention-based theories as well as Levine’s theory predict that Responders transfer nothing back. 
If one takes into account that some transfers in the DG are driven by inequity aversion or quasi-
maximin preferences, the difference between the transfers in the DG and the transfers in the TG 
measure the relevance of intention- or type-based theories. Cox’ results indicate that these 
theories play only a minor or no role in this context. In one condition there is no difference in 
transfers between the TG and the DG and in another condition transfers in the DG are lower by 
only one third.  
The strongest evidence against the role of intentions comes from Bolton, Brandts and 
Ockenfels (1998). They conducted sequential social dilemma experiments that are akin to a 
sequentially played Prisonners’ Dilemma. In one condition the first movers could make a kind 
choice relative to a baseline choice. The kind choice implied that – for any choice of the second 
mover- the payoff of the second mover increased by 400 units at a cost of 100 for the first mover. 
Then the second mover could take costly actions in order to reward the first mover. In a control 
condition the first mover could only make the baseline choice, i.e. he could not express any kind 
intentions. It turns out that second movers reward the first movers even more in this control 
condition. Although this difference is not significant, the results clearly suggest that intention-
driven rewards play no role in this experiment.  
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The strongest evidence in favor of intentions comes from the moonlighting game of FFF 
(2000b) described in the previous subsection. FFF find that for all positive transfers of player A, 
players B send back significantly more money in the human choice condition. Moreover, the 
difference between the rewards in the human choice condition and the random choice condition 
are also quantitatively important. A recent paper by McCabe, Rigdon and Smith (2000) also 
reports evidence in favor of intention driven positive reciprocity. They show that after a nice 
choice of the first-mover two thirds of the second movers make nice choices, too, while if the 
first mover is forced to make the nice choice only one third of the second movers make the nice 
choice.  
In the absence of the evidence provided by FFF and McCabe et al. one would have to 
conclude that the motive to reward good intentions or fair types is (at best) of minor importance. 
However, in view of the relatively strong results in the final two papers it seems wise to be more 
cautious and to wait for further evidence. Nevertheless, the bulk of the evidence suggests that 
inequity aversion and efficiency seeking are more important than intention- or type-based 
reciprocity in the domain of kind behavior. 
  
4.5 Summary and Outlook 
Although most fairness models discussed in Section 3 are just a few years old the discussion in 
this section shows that there is already a fair amount of evidence that sheds light on the relative 
performance of the different models. This indicates a quick and healthy interaction between 
experimental research and the development of new theories. The initial experimental results 
discussed in Section 2 gave rise to a number of new theories which, in turn, have again been 
quickly subjected to careful and rigorous empirical testing. Although these tests have not yet led 
to conclusive results regarding the relative importance of the different motives many important 
and interesting insights have been obtained. In our view the main results can be summarized as 
follows:  
1) Evidence from the Third Party Punishment Game and the PGG with punishment indicates 
that many subjects do compare themselves with other people in the group and not just to the 
group as a whole or to the group average.  
2) There is a non-negligible number of subjects in DGs whose behavior is consistent with 
surplus maximization. However, the relative quantitative importance of this motive in 
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economically relevant settings has yet to be determined and surplus maximization alone 
cannot account for many robust regularities in other games. 
3) Pure revenge as captured by reciprocity models is an important motive for payoff-reducing 
behavior. In some games like the PGG with punishment it seems to be the dominant source of 
payoff-reducing behavior. Since pure equity models do not capture this motive they cannot 
explain a significant amount of payoff-reducing behavior.  
4) In the domain of kind behavior the motives captured by intention- or type-based models of 
fairness seem to be less important than in the domain of payoff-reducing behavior. Several 
studies indicate that inequity aversion or quasi-maximin preferences play a more important 
role here. 
Which model of fairness does best in the light of the data and which one should be used in 
applications to economically important phenomena? We believe that it is too early to give a 
conclusive answer to these questions. There is a large amount of heterogeneity at the individual 
level and any model of fairness has difficulties in explaining the full diversity of the experimental 
observations. The evidence suggests, however, some tentative answers to these questions. In our 
view the most important heterogeneity is the one between purely selfish subjects and fair-minded 
subjects. The success of the BO-model and the FS-model in explaining a large variety of data 
from bargaining, co-operation and market games is partly due to this recognition. Within the 
class of these equity models the evidence suggests that the FS-model does better. In particular, 
the experiments discussed in Section 4.1 indicate that people do not compare themselves with the 
group as a whole but rather with other individuals in the group. The group average is less 
compelling as a yardstick to measure equity than differences in individual payoffs. 
However, the FS-model clearly does not recognize the full heterogeneity within the class 
of fair-minded individuals. Section 4.4 makes it clear that an important part of payoff-reducing 
behavior is not driven by the desire to reduce payoff-differences but by the desire to reduce the 
payoff of those who take unfair actions or reveal themselves as unfair types. The model therefore 
underestimates the amount of punishing behavior in situations where the cost of punishment is 
relatively high compared to the payoff-reductions that can be achieved by punishing. Fairness 
models that are exclusively based on intentions (Rabin 1993, Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger 1998) 
can, in principle, account for this type of punishment. Yet, these models have other undesirable 
features - including multiple, and very counterintuitive, equilibria in many games and a very high 
degree of complexity that is due to the use of psychological game theory. The same has to be said 
about the intention-based theory of Charness and Rabin (2000). Falk and Fischbacher (1999) is 
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not plagued by the multiple equilibrium problem as much as the pure intention models. This is 
due to the fact that they incorporate equity as a global reference standard. Their model shares 
however, the complexity costs of psychological game theory.  
Even though none of the available theories can take into account the full complexity of 
motives at the individual level, some theories may allow for better approximations than others. 
The evidence presented in Section 2 shows clearly that there are many important economic 
problems for which the self-interest theory is unambiguously, and in a quantitatively important 
way, refuted. The recent papers by BO and FS show that one can account for the bulk of this 
evidence by models that explicitly take into account that there are selfish and fair-minded 
individuals. Although we believe that it is desirable to tackle the heterogeneity within the class of 
fair-minded subjects in parsimonious and tractable models, we also believe that the heterogeneity 
between selfish and fair types is more important. In fact, in the following section we will show 
that the FS-model provides surprisingly good qualitative and quantitative predictions in important 
economic domains. Thus, even if we do net yet have a fully satisfactory model of fair behavior, 
one can probably go a long way with simple models that take into account the interaction 
between selfish and fair types.  
 
5  Economic Applications 
5.1  Competition and Fairness – When Does Fairness Matter? 
The self-interest model fails to explain the experimental evidence in many games in which only a 
few players interact, but it is very successful in explaining the outcome of competitive markets. It 
is a well-established experimental fact that in a broad class of market games prices converge to 
the competitive equilibrium.33 This result holds even if the resulting allocation is very unfair by 
any notion of fairness. Thus, the question arises: If so many people resist unfair outcomes in, say, 
the ultimatum game, why don’t they behave the same way when there is competition among the 
players? 
To answer this question consider the following ultimatum game with Proposer 
competition, that was conducted by Roth, Prasnikar, Okuno-Fujiwara, and Zamir (1991) in four 
different countries. There are n-1 Proposers who simultaneously offer a share siÎ[0,1], i Î {1, ..., 
n-1}, to one Responder. The Responder can either accept or reject the highest offer smax = maxi 
{si}. If there are several Proposers who offered smax, one of them is selected at random with equal 
                                                
33 See e.g. Smith (1962) and Davis and Holt (1993).  
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probability. If the Responder accepts smax, her monetary payoff is smax and the successful Proposer 
earns 1- smax, while all the other Proposers get 0. If the Responder rejects, everybody gets a 
payoff of 0.  
The prediction of the self-interest model is straightforward: All Proposers will offer s=1 
which is accepted by the Responder. Hence, all Proposers get a payoff of zero and the 
monopolistic Responder captures the entire surplus. This outcome is clearly very unfair, but it 
describes precisely what happened in the experiments. After a few periods of adaptation smax was 
very close to 1 and all the surplus was captured by the Responder.34  
This result is remarkable. It does not seem to be more fair  that one side of the market gets 
all of the surplus in this setting than in the standard ultimatum game. Why do the Proposers let 
the Responder get away with it? The reason is that in this strategic setting preferences for fairness 
or reciprocity cannot have any effect. To see this, suppose that each of the Proposers strongly 
dislikes to get less than the Responder. Consider Proposer i and let s’= maxj¹i { sj } be the highest 
offer made by his fellow Proposers. If Proposer i offers si < s’, then his offer has no effect and he 
will get a monetary payoff of 0 with certainty. Furthermore, he cannot prevent that the Responder 
gets s’ and that one of the other Proposers gets 1-s’, so he will suffer from getting less than these 
two. However, if he offers a little bit more than s’, say s’+e, then he will win the competition, get 
a positive monetary payoff, and reduce the inequality between himself and the Responder. Hence, 
he should try to overbid his competitors. This process drives the share that is offered by the 
Proposers up to 1. There is nothing the Proposers can do about it even if all of them have a strong 
preference for fairness. We prove this result formally in Fehr and Schmidt (1999) for the case of 
inequity averse players, but the same result is also predicted by the approaches of Bolton and 
Ockenfels (2000) and Levine (1998).  
Does this mean that sufficiently strong competition will always wipe out the impact of 
fairness? The answer to this question is negative because fairness matters much more in market 
games in which the execution of contracts cannot be completely determined at the stage where 
the parties conclude the contracts. Labor markets are a good example. A labor contracts is highly 
incomplete, because it cannot enforce the level of effort provided by the employee who chooses 
his effort level after the contract has been signed. These contractual features are captured by the 
Gift Exchange Game (GEG) in an experimental setting.  
                                                
34 The experiments were conducted in Israel, Japan, Slovenia and the U.S. In all experiments there were 9 Proposers 
and 1 responder. Roth et.al. also conducted the standard ultimatum game with one Proposer in these four countries. 
They did find some small (but statistically signifant) differences between countries in the standard ultimatum game 
which may be attributed to cultural differences. However, there are no statistically significant differences between 
countries for the ultimatum game with Proposer competition.   
  40
When the GEG is embedded into a competitive experimental market, as e.g. in Fehr, 
Kirchsteiger and Riedl (1998, 1998), wages turn out to be systematically higher than the 
competitive equilibrium wage predicted by the self-interest model. There is also no tendency for 
wages to decrease over time. The reason for this stable wage premium is the effort behavior of 
the Responders: On average, effort levels are increasing with wages which provides an incentive 
for the firms to pay a wage premium. If, however, the effort level is fixed exogenously by the 
experimenter, the firms do not shy away from pushing down wages to the competitive level. FS 
and BO can explain this pattern in a straightforward manner. When effort is endogenous, inequity 
averse Responders respond to high wages with high effort levels in order to prevent an unequal 
distribution of the surplus from trade. This induces all firms (including purely selfish ones) to pay 
a wage premium because it is profitable to do so. When effort is exogenous this mechanism does 
not work and competition drives down wages to the competitive level. 
 
5.2.  Endogenous Incomplete Contracts 
If fairness concerns affect the behavior of economic agents in so many situations, then it 
should also be taken into account in the design of incentive schemes. Surprisingly, hardly any 
theoretical and very little empirical or experimental work has been done to study the impact of 
fairness on incentive provision. Standard contract theory neglects this issue and assumes that all 
agents are only interested in their own material payoffs. Over the past two decades this theory has 
been highly successful in solving fairly complicated contractual problems and in designing very 
sophisticated mechanisms and incentive schemes. This gave rise to many important and 
fascinating insights, and the methods developed there have been applied in almost all areas of 
economics. However, standard contract theory still finds it difficult to explain the simplicity and 
incompleteness of many contracts that we observe in the real world. In particular, it cannot 
explain why the parties’ monetary payoffs are often not tied to measures of performance that 
would be available at a relatively small cost. For example, the salary of a teacher or a university 
professor is rarely contingent on students’ test scores, teaching ratings, or citations. These 
performance measures are readily available and easily verifiable, so one has to conclude that 
these contracts are deliberately left incomplete.35  
                                                
35 The literature on incomplete contracts acknowledges contractual incompleteness, but most of this literature simply 
assumes that no long-term contingent contracts are feasible and does not attempt to explain this premise. See, e.g., 
Grossman and Hart (1986) or Hart and Moore (1990) and Section 5.3 below. There is a small literature on 
endogenous incomplete contracts. Some papers in this literature, e.g. Aghion, Dewatripont and Rey (1994), Nöldeke 
and Schmidt (1995) or  Edlin and Reichelstein (1996), show that in some situations a properly designed incomplete 
contract can implement the first best, so there is no need to write a more complete contract. Some other papers, e.g. 
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In a recent paper, Fehr, Klein and Schmidt (2000) take a fresh look at contractual 
incompleteness by taking concerns for fairness and reciprocity into account. They report on 
several simple principal-agent experiments in which the principal was given a choice whether to 
offer a “complete” contract or a less complete one. In the first experimental design an agent had 
to pick an effort level between 1 and 10 (at a monetary cost to herself) that is perfectly observed 
by a principal and can be verified (at a small fixed cost) to the courts. The principal can try to 
induce the agent to spend effort by imposing a fine on the agent that is enforced by the courts if 
she works too little. However, the fine is bounded above so that the highest implementable effort 
level (e*=4) falls short of the first best efficient action (eFB=10). In this contractual environment 
principal agent theory predicts that the principal should use the maximal fine in order to induce 
the agent to choose e*=4, and that he should offer a fixed wage that holds the agent down to her 
reservation utility. If the agent complies with the contract, the principal can capture roughly 30 
percent of the first best surplus for himself while the agent gets nothing.  
There are two alternatives to this “incentive contract”. In one treatment the principal could 
choose to offer a “trust contract” which does without a fine and simply pays a generous fixed 
wage up front to the agent asking her to reciprocate by spending a higher level of effort. 
However, effort cannot be enforced with this contract. In a second treatment the principal could 
offer a “bonus contract”, which specifies a fixed wage, a desired level of effort, and an 
announced bonus payment if the effort is to the principal’s satisfaction. However, both parties 
know that the bonus cannot be enforced and is left at the discretion of the principal. The trust and 
the bonus contract are clearly less complete than the incentive contract. Because the experiments 
carefully rule out any repeated interactions between the parties, both types of contracts are, 
according to standard principal agent theory, doomed to fail. Given the fixed wage, a pure self-
interested agent will not spend any effort.  Similarly, a principal who is only interested in his own 
income will never pay a bonus, so a rational agent should never put in any effort. 
If concerns for fairness and reciprocity are taken into account, the predictions are less 
clear cut. Consider again the optimal incentive contract (as suggested by principal agent theory). 
This contract aims at a rather unfair distribution of the surplus. If the agent is concerned about 
this, there are two ways how she could punish the principal. First, as in an ultimatum game, she 
could simply reject the contract in which case both parties get a payoff of zero. A second, and 
more interesting, punishment strategy is to accept the contract and to shirk. Note that if the 
                                                                                                                                                         
Che and Hausch (1998), Segal (1999) and Hart and Moore (1999) show that, although an incomplete contract does 
not implement the first best, a more complete contract is of no value to the parties because it is impossible to get 
closer to the efficiency frontier. 
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incentive compatibility constraint is just binding, then the cost of shirking to the agent is zero and 
independent of the fixed wage offered by the principal. Thus, if the principal offers a somewhat 
higher wage, that gives a positive (but still “unfair”) share of the surplus to the agent, the agent 
can punish the principal by accepting the wage and shirking (at zero cost to herself). Hence, 
concerns for fairness and reciprocity suggest that the principal has to offer a fairly generous wage 
in order to get the agent to accept and to work, which makes the incentive contract less attractive.  
On the other hand, concerns for fairness and reciprocity improve the performance of trust 
and bonus contracts.  A fair agent will reciprocate to a generous wage offer in a trust contract by 
putting in a higher effort level voluntarily. Similarly, a fair principal will reciprocate to a high 
effort level by paying a generous bonus, making it worth the agent’s while to spend more effort. 
Unfortunately, however, on such a general level it is impossible to make any clear cut predictions 
about the relative performance of the three types of contracts. Is the incentive contract going to be 
outperformed by the trust and/or the bonus contract? Induces the bonus contract a higher level of 
effort than the trust contract or rather the other way round?  
In order to obtain quantitative predictions for the experiments, Fehr, Klein and Schmidt 
(2000) apply the model of inequity aversion by Fehr and Schmidt (1999) to this moral hazard 
problem. Most other models of fairness or intention-based reciprocity would probably yield 
similar results and we want to stress that these experiments were not designed to discriminate 
between different notions of fairness. The main advantage of our model of inequity aversion is 
just its simplicity, which makes it straightforward to apply to these games. However, Fehr, Klein 
and Schmidt (2000) have to make a few additional assumptions. In particular, they assume for 
simplicity that there are only two types of subjects, “selfish” players who are only interested in 
their own material payoffs, and “fair” players who are willing to give up own resources in order 
to achieve a more equal payoff distribution. Furthermore, in rough accordance with the 
experimental results of many ultimatum and dictator games, they assume that 60 percent of the 
population are selfish and 40 percent are fair.  
With these assumptions it is a straightforward exercise to analyse the different types of 
contracts and to obtain the following predictions: 
1. Trust Contracts: Fair agents will reciprocate to high wage offers by putting in an effort level 
that equalizes payoffs, while selfish agents will choose the minimum effort level of 1. Thus, a 
higher wage offer will, on average, induce a higher level of effort. However, it can be shown 
that if less than 2/3 of all agents are fair, paying a higher wage does not raise the principal’s 
expected profit. Therefore, with 40 percent fair agents, the trust contract is not going to work. 
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2. Incentive Contracts: For the same reason as in the trust contract it does not pay for the 
principals to elicit higher average effort levels by paying generous wages. Thus, both selfish 
and fair principals impose the highest possible fine to induce the agent to choose e = 4. 
However, while the fair principals share the surplus arising from e = 4 equally with the agent, 
selfish principals propose unfair contracts that give them the whole surplus. They anticipate 
that the fair agents reject these contracts, but because the 60 percent selfish agents accept 
these contracts, this strategy is still profitable.  
3. Bonus Contracts: Selfish principals always pay a bonus of zero but fair principals pay a 
bonus that divides the surplus equally between the principal and the agent. Therefore, the 
bonus is on average increasing with the agent’s effort. Moreover, the relation between the 
effort and the average bonus is sufficiently steep to induce a selfish agent to put it an effort 
level of 7. However, the fair agent chooses an effort level of only 1 or 2 (depending on the 
fixed wage). The reason for this surprising result is that the fair agent is not only concerned 
about her expected monetary payoff, but that she suffers in addition from the inequality that 
arises if a selfish principal does not pay the bonus. Nevertheless, on average, the bonus 
contract implements a higher level of effort (e=5.2) and yields a higher payoff for the 
principal than both, the incentive contract and the trust contract.36 
What are the experimental results? Each experiment had 10 periods, in each of which each 
principal was matched randomly and anonymously with a different agent. In the first treatment, 
where principals could choose between a trust and an incentive contract, roughly 50 percent of 
the principals chose a trust contract and 50 percent chose an incentive contract in period 1. 
However, the fraction of incentive contracts rose quickly and after period 5 roughly 80 percent of 
all contractual choices were incentive contracts. Those principals who offered a trust contract 
paid generous wages to which some agents reciprocated by putting in a high effort level. 
However, in 64 percent of all trust contracts the agents chose e=1. Thus, on average, principals 
incurred considerable losses when they proposed trust contracts. The incentive contracts did 
better, but they did much less well than predicted by standard principal agent theory. They also 
did less well than predicted by the model of inequity aversion. The reason is that at the beginning 
many principals offered incentive contracts with fairly high wages that were not incentive 
                                                
36 The analysis of the bonus contract is complicated by the fact that the principal has to move twice. He offers the 
terms of the contract at the first stage of the game and he has to choose his bonus payment at the last stage. Thus, his 
contract offer may reveal some information about his type. However, it can be shown that there is no separating 
equilibrium in this game and that all pooling equilibria have the properties described above. Furthermore, if we 
assume that a higher wage offer is not interpreted by the agent as a signal that she faces the selfish principal with a 
higher probability, then there is a unique pooling equilibrium. See Fehr, Klein and Schmidt (2000). 
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compatible. In these cases 62 percent of the agents shirked imposing considerable losses on 
principals. On the other hand, those principals who offered incentive compatible incentive 
contracts with low wages did fairly well. Principals learnt to properly design incentive contracts 
over time. The fraction of incentive compatible contracts increased from only 10 percent in 
period 1 to 64 percent in period 10.  
In the second treatment the principal had to choose between a bonus contract and an 
incentive contract. From the very beginning the bonus contract was much more popular than the 
incentive contract and accounted for roughly 90 percent of all contractual choices. Many 
principals did not pay a bonus, but a significant fraction reciprocated generously to higher effort 
levels. The average bonus was, therefore, strongly increasing in the effort level which made it 
worthwhile for the agents to put forward rather high effort levels. The average effort level was 
5.2, which is significantly higher than the average effort of 2.5 induced by incentive contracts. 
The bonus contract is not only more efficient than the incentive contract, it also yields on average 
a much higher payoff to the principal and a moderately higher payoff to the agent. These results 
are clearly inconsistent with the self-interest model while the model of inequity aversion explains 
them surprisingly well.37 
Our experiments demonstrate that quite powerful incentives can be given by a very 
incomplete bonus contract. The bonus contract relies on reciprocal fairness as an enforcement 
device. It does better than the more complete incentive contracts because it is incomplete and 
thus leaves more freedom to the parties to reciprocate. This enforcement mechanism is not 
perfect and, depending on the payoff structure and the fraction of reciprocal types in the 
population, it can fail. In fact, we have seen that the trust contract, in which the principal has to 
pay the “bonus” unconditionally in advance, is not viable in the set up of our experiments. Yet, 
the performance of the bonus contract suggests that the effect of reciprocal fairness, that has been 
neglected in contract theory so far, is important for optimal contractual design and should be 
taken into account.  
 
                                                
37 In a second experimental design, Fehr, Klein and Schmidt (2000) consider a multi-task principal agent model 
inspired by Holmström and Milgrom (1991). In this experiment the agents have to choose two separate effort levels 
(“tasks”), e1 and e2, both of which are observable by the principal but only e1 is verifiable and can be contracted 
upon. The principal can choose between a piece-rate contract that rewards the agent for his effort spent on task 1 and 
a bonus contract that announces a voluntary bonus payment if the agent’s effort on both tasks is to the principal’s 
satisfaction. The overwhelming majority of principals opted for the bonus contract which induced the agents to 
spend, on average, a considerable amount of effort and to allocate total effort efficiently across tasks. Those 
principals that chose a piece-rate contract, induced the agents to concentrate all of their total efforts on task 1, which 
is very inefficient. Again, these results are inconsistent with the self-interest model, but they can be nicely explained 
by the Fehr-Schmidt model of inequity aversion. 
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5.3  The Optimal Allocation of Ownership Rights 
Consider two parties, A and B, who are engaged in a joined project (a “firm”) to which they have 
to make some relationship specific investments today in order to generate a joint surplus in the 
future. An important question that has received considerable attention in recent years is who 
should own the firm. In a seminal paper, Grossman and Hart (1986) argue that ownership rights 
allocate residual rights of control on the physical assets that are required to generate the surplus. 
For example, if A owns the firm, then he will have a stronger bargaining position than B in the 
renegotiation game in which the surplus between the two parties is shared ex post, because he can 
exclude B from using the assets which makes B’s relationship specific investment less 
productive. Grossman and Hart show that there is no ownership structure that implements first 
best investments, but some ownership structures do better than others and there is a unique 
second best optimal allocation of ownership rights.  
A common feature of most incomplete contract models is that joint ownership cannot be 
optimal.38 This result is at odds with the fact that there are many jointly owned companies, 
partnerships or joint ventures. Furthermore, the argument neglects that reciprocal fairness may be 
an important enforcement mechanism to induce the involved parties to invest more under joint 
ownership than otherwise predicted. In order to test this hypothesis, Fehr, Kremhelmer and 
Schmidt (2000) conducted a series of experiments on the optimal allocation of ownership rights. 
The experimental game is a grossly simplified version of Grossman and Hart (1986): There are 
two parties, A and B, who have to make investments, a, b Î {1, ..., 10}, respectively, in order to 
generate a joint surplus v(a,b). Investments are sequential: B has to invest first, his investment 
level b is observed by A, who has to invest thereafter. We consider two possible ownership 
structures: Under A-ownership, A hires B as an employee and pays her a fixed wage w. In this 
case monetary payoffs are v(a,b)-w-a for A and w-b for B. Under joint ownership, each party gets 
half of the gross surplus minus his or her investment cost, i.e. 0.5v(a,b)–a for A and 0.5v(a,b)-b 
for B. The gross profit function has been chosen such that maximal investments are efficient, i.e. 
                                                
38 To see this note that in the renegotiation game in which the surplus is shared each party gets its reservation utility 
plus a fixed fraction (50 percent, say) of the joint surplus in excess of the sum of the reservation utilities. Now 
consider A-ownership. If A invests, then his investment increases not only the joint surplus but also his reservation 
utility (i.e., what he could get out of the firm without B’s collaboration). On the other hand, if B invests, then her 
investment increases only the joint surplus, but it does not improve her reservation utility. The reason is that the 
investment requires access to the firm in order to be productive. Hence, without the firm B’s investment is useless. 
This is why A will invest more than B under A-ownership. Consider now joint ownership. If both parties own the 
firm jointly, then each of them can prevent the other from using the assets. Hence neither A’s nor B’s investment 
affects their respective reservation utilities. Therefore, A’s investment incentives are reduced while B’s investment 
incentives do not improve. Hence, joint ownership is Inferior. 
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aFB=bFB=10, but if each party gets only 50 percent of the marginal return of their investments, 
then it is a dominant strategy for a purely self-interested player to choose the minimum level of 
investment, a = b = 1. Finally, in the first stage of the game, A can decide whether to be the sole 
owner of the firm and make a wage offer to B, or whether to have joint ownership. 
The prediction of the self-interest model is straightforward. Under A-ownership B has no 
incentive to invest and will choose b=1 . On the other hand, A is full residual claimant on the 
margin, so she will invest efficiently. Under joint ownership each party gets only 50 percent of 
the marginal return which is not sufficient to induce any investments. Hence in this case B’s 
optimal investment level is unchanged, but A’s investment level is reduced to a=1. Thus, A-
ownership outperforms joint ownership and A should hire B as an employee.  
In the experiments just the opposite happened. Party A chose joint ownership in more 
than 80 percent (187 out of 230) of all observations and gave away 50 percent of the gross return 
to B. Moreover, the fraction of joint ownership contracts increased from 74 percent in the first 
two periods to 89 percent in the last two periods. With joint ownership B-players chose on 
average an investment level of 8.9 and A responded with an investment of 6.5 (on average). On 
the other hand, if A-ownership was chosen and A hired B as an employee, B’s average 
investment was only 1.3, while all A-players chose an investment level of 10. Furthermore A-
players earned much more on average if they chose joint ownership rather than A-ownership.  
These results are inconsistent with the self-interest model, but it is straightforward to 
explain them with concerns for fairness. Applying the Fehr-Schmidt (1999) model of inequity 
aversion gives again fairly accurate quantitative predictions. Thus, the experimental results and 
the theoretical analysis suggest that joint ownership may do better than A-ownership because it 
offers more scope for reciprocal behavior. Subjects seem to understand this and predominantly 
choose this ownership structure.  
 
6  Conclusions 
The self-interest model has been very successful in explaining individual behavior on competitive 
markets, but it is unambiguously refuted in many situations in which individuals interact 
strategically. The experimental evidence on, e.g., ultimatum games, dictator games, gift exchange 
games, and public good games, demonstrates unambiguously that many people are not only 
maximizing their own material payoffs, but that they are also concerned about social 
comparisons, fairness, and the desire to reciprocate.  
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We have reviewed several models that try to take these concerns explicitly into account. A 
general lesson to be drawn from these models is that the assumption that some people are fair-
minded and have the desire to reciprocate does not imply that these people will always behave 
“fairly”. In some environments like, e.g. in competitive markets or in public good games without 
punishment, fair-minded actors will often behave as if they are purely self-interested. Likewise, a 
purely self-interested person may often behave as if he is strongly concerned about fairness like, 
e.g., the Proposers who make fair proposals in the ultimatum game or generous wage offers in the 
gift exchange game. Thus, the behavior of fair-minded and purely self-interested actors depends 
on the strategic environment in which they interact and on their beliefs about the fairness of their 
opponents. The analysis of this behavior is not trivial and it is helpful to develop theoretical tools 
to better understand what we observe.  
Some of the models reviewed above focus solely on preferences over income distributions 
and ignore the fact that people often care about the intentions behind the actions of their 
opponents. Some other papers focus only on intention-based or type-based reciprocity and ignore 
the fact that some people are bothered by unfair distributions even if their opponent could not do 
anything about it. It seems natural to try to combine these two motivations in a single model as 
has been done by Falk and Fischbacher (1998) and Charness and Rabin (2000). However, we 
believe that the cost of doing so is high. These models are rather complicated, they rely on 
psychological game theory and it is difficult to apply them even to very simple experimental 
games. Moreover, Charness and Rabin, in particular, is plagued with multiple equilibria and has 
much more free parameters than all other models. On the other hand, simple models of social 
preferences, like Bolton and Ockenfels’ (2000) ERC-model or our own (1999) model of inequity 
aversion, fit the data on large classes of games fairly well. They use standard game theory, they 
have fewer parameters to be estimated, and it is fairly straightforward to get clear-cut qualitative 
and quantitative predictions.  
The main advantage of these simple models is that they can easily be applied to other 
fields in economics. For more than 20 years experimental economists concentrated on simple 
experimental games in order to better understand what drives economic behavior. However, very 
few of the insights that have been gained had any impact on how economists interpret the world. 
We feel that it is now time to change this. Many phenomena in situations in which people interact 
strategically cannot be understood by relying on the self-interest model alone. Our examples from 
contract theory and the theory of property rights illustrate that models of reciprocal fairness can 
be fruitfully applied to important and interesting economic questions, yielding predictions that are 
much closer to what we observe in many situations of the real world and in carefully controlled 
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experiments than the predictions of the self-interest model. There are many other areas in which 
fairness models are likely to generate interesting new insights - be it the functioning of labor 
markets or questions of political economy, be it the design of optimal mechanisms or questions of 
compliance with organizational rules and the law.  
We hope that this is just the beginning. There is no shortage of important questions to 
which the newly developed tools and insights can be applied.  
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